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The income transfer effect, the access value of insurance and the Rand health insurance experiment

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  • Nyman, John A.

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  • Nyman, John A., 2001. "The income transfer effect, the access value of insurance and the Rand health insurance experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 295-298, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:20:y:2001:i:2:p:295-298
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Manning, Willard G, et al, 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 251-277, June.
    2. Manning, Willard G. & Marquis, M. Susan, 2001. "Health insurance: tradeoffs revisited," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 289-293, March.
    3. Manning, Willard G. & Marquis, M. Susan, 1996. "Health insurance: The tradeoff between risk pooling and moral hazard," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(5), pages 609-639, October.
    4. Blomqvist, Ake, 2001. "Does the economics of moral hazard need to be revisited? A comment on the paper by John Nyman," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 283-288, March.
    5. Nyman, John A., 1999. "The economics of moral hazard revisited," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 811-824, December.
    6. Nyman, John A., 1999. "The value of health insurance: the access motive," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-152, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rutten, Frans & Bleichrodt, Han & Brouwer, Werner & Koopmanschap, Marc & Schut, Erik, 2001. "Handbook of Health Economics," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 855-879, September.
    2. Simplice Asongu & Nicholas M. Odhiambo, 2020. "Financial access, governance and insurance sector development in sub-Saharan Africa," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 47(4), pages 849-875, February.
    3. Glied, Sherry A. & Remler, Dahlia K., 2002. "What Every Public Finance Economist Needs to Know About Health Economics: Recent Advances and Unresolved Questions," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 55(4), pages 771-788, December.
    4. Sherry Glied, 2003. "Health Insurance Expansions and the Content of Coverage: Is Something Better Than Nothing?," NBER Chapters, in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 6, pages 55-86, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Cockx, Bart & Brasseur, Carine, 2003. "The demand for physician services: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(6), pages 881-913, November.
    6. Emmanuel Nshakira-Rukundo & Essa Chanie Mussa & Nathan Nshakira & Nicolas Gerber & Joachim von Braun, 2021. "Impact of community-based health insurance on utilisation of preventive health services in rural Uganda: a propensity score matching approach," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 203-227, June.
    7. Blomqvist, Ake, 2001. "Rejoinder," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 299-299, March.
    8. Wendy Xu & Bryan Dowd & Jean Abraham, 2016. "Lessons from state mandates of preventive cancer screenings," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 17(2), pages 203-215, March.

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