A theoretical investigation of the reformed public health insurance in urban China
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DOI: 10.1007/s11459-009-0001-8
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More about this item
Keywords
health insurance; medical service utilization; moral hazard; co-payment rate; physicians’ incentive; I11; I18; 医疗保险; 医疗服务使用; 道德风险; 自负比率; 医生动机;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
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