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Experience, screening and syndication in venture capital investments

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  • Casamatta, Catherine
  • Haritchabalet, Carole

Abstract

We consider a theoretical model that offers a rationale for the syndication of venture capital investments: syndication improves the screening process of venture capitalists and prevents competition between investors after investment opportunities are disclosed. The analysis identifies the costs of syndication in terms of investment decisions or post-investment involvement of venture capitalists. These costs depend crucially on the level of experience of venture capitalists. The model generates empirical predictions concerning the determinants of syndication and the characteristics of syndicated deals.
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(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Casamatta, Catherine & Haritchabalet, Carole, 2007. "Experience, screening and syndication in venture capital investments," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 368-398, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:16:y:2007:i:3:p:368-398
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    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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