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Anticompetitive effects of horizontal acquisitions: The impact of within-industry product similarity

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  • Fathollahi, Maryam
  • Harford, Jarrad
  • Klasa, Sandy

Abstract

Theory predicts that horizontal acquisitions can effectively increase incumbent firms’ market power in concentrated industries with high product similarity. Using a novel measure for industry product similarity, we show that in such industries firms’ propensity to make horizontal acquisitions is greater and that the acquisitions result in more positive announcement returns for the acquirer and rival firms and in a larger premium paid for the target. Also, the deals harm dependent customer and supplier firms and they are more likely to be challenged by antitrust authorities. Overall, by emphasizing the importance of product similarity, our results help explain mixed empirical findings on whether horizontal acquisitions are used to reduce competition intensity.

Suggested Citation

  • Fathollahi, Maryam & Harford, Jarrad & Klasa, Sandy, 2022. "Anticompetitive effects of horizontal acquisitions: The impact of within-industry product similarity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 645-669.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:144:y:2022:i:2:p:645-669
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.017
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Horizontal acquisitions; Product similarity; Product market competition; Industry concentration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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