The Cartelization of World Commodity Markets
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- Juan‐Pablo Montero & Juan Ignacio Guzman, 2010. "Output‐Expanding Collusion In The Presence Of A Competitive Fringe," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 106-126, March.
- Benchekroun, Hassan & Gaudet, Gerard & Van Long, Ngo, 2006.
"Temporary natural resource cartels,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 663-674, November.
- BENCHEKROUN, Hassan & GAUDET, Gérard & LONG, Ngo Van, 2004. "Temporary Natural Resource Cartels," Cahiers de recherche 2004-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- BENCHEKROUN, Hassan & GAUDET, Gérard & LONG, Ngo Van, 2004. "Temporary Natural Resource Cartels," Cahiers de recherche 03-2004, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Karp, Larry, 1995. "Monopoly Power can be Disadvantageous in the Extraction of a Durable Nonrenewable Resource," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt4cs0m1vb, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- M. H. I. Dore, 1987. "Mineral Taxation in Jamaica: An Oligopoly Confronts Taxes on Resource Rents — and Prevails," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 179-203, April.
- John M. Connor, 2003.
"Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, and Anticartel Enforcement,"
Working Papers
03-12, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
- Connor, John M., 2003. "Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, And Anticartel Enforcement," Staff Papers 28645, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
- Frankel, Jeffrey A., 2010.
"The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey,"
Scholarly Articles
4454156, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Frankel, Jeffrey, 2010. "The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey," Working Paper Series rwp10-005, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Jeffrey A. Frankel, 2010. "The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey," NBER Working Papers 15836, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jeffrey Frankel, 2010. "The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey," CID Working Papers 195, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
- Siebert, Horst, 1987. "Entwicklungstendenzen der Weltwirtschaft: Stilisierte Fakten und Ansätze zur Erklärung," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 1347, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
- Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Siebert, Horst, 1987. "Entwicklungslinien der Weltwirtschaft: Stilisierte Fakten und Ansätze zur Erklärung," Discussion Papers, Series II 14, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
- Thomas, Jonathan P., 1988. "Cartel stability in an exhaustible resource model," Discussion Papers, Series II 61, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
- Fathollahi, Maryam & Harford, Jarrad & Klasa, Sandy, 2022. "Anticompetitive effects of horizontal acquisitions: The impact of within-industry product similarity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 645-669.
- W. Welch, 1981. "Money and votes: A simultaneous equation model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 209-234, January.
- Rausser, Gordon & Stuermer, Martin, 2020. "A Dynamic Analysis of Collusive Action: The Case of the World Copper Market, 1882-2016," MPRA Paper 104708, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Juan Ignacio Guzmán, 2018. "The International Copper Cartel, 1935–1939: the good cartel?," Mineral Economics, Springer;Raw Materials Group (RMG);Luleå University of Technology, vol. 31(1), pages 113-125, May.
- Ngo Long, 2015. "Dynamic Games Between Firms and Infinitely Lived Consumers: A Review of the Literature," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 467-492, December.
- Karp, Larry, 1996.
"Monopoly Power Can Be Disadvantageous in the Extraction of a Durable Nonrenewable Resource,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(4), pages 825-849, November.
- Karp, Larry, 1995. "Monopoly Power can be Disadvantageous in the Extraction of a Durable Nonrenewable Resource," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt4cs0m1vb, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
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