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Democracy and credit

Author

Listed:
  • Delis, Manthos D.
  • Hasan, Iftekhar
  • Ongena, Steven

Abstract

Does democratization reduce the cost of credit? Using global syndicated loan data from 1984 to 2014, we find that democratization has a sizable negative effect on loan spreads: a 1-point increase in the zero-to-ten Polity IV index of democracy shaves at least 19 basis points off spreads, but likely more. Reversals to autocracy hike spreads more strongly. Our findings are robust to the comprehensive inclusion of relevant controls, to the instrumentation with regional waves of democratization, and to a battery of other sensitivity tests. We thus highlight the lower cost of loans as one relevant mechanism through which democratization can affect economic development.

Suggested Citation

  • Delis, Manthos D. & Hasan, Iftekhar & Ongena, Steven, 2020. "Democracy and credit," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(2), pages 571-596.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:136:y:2020:i:2:p:571-596
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.09.013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Loan pricing; Loan spreads; Democratic institutions; Reversals;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P27 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Performance and Prospects
    • P47 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Performance and Prospects

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