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Democratic development and credit: "Democracy doesn't come cheap" But at least credit to its corporations will be

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  • Delis, Manthos D.
  • Hasan, Iftekhar
  • Ongena, Steven

Abstract

Does democratization reduce the cost of credit? Using global syndicated loan data from 1984 to 2014, we find that democratization has a sizeable negative effect on loan spreads: a one-point increase in the zero-to-ten Polity IV index of democracy shaves at least 19 basis points off spreads, but likely more. Reversals to autocracy hike spreads more strongly. Our findings are robust to the comprehensive inclusion of relevant controls, to the instrumentation with regional waves of democratization, and to a battery of other sensitivity tests. We thus highlight the lower cost of loans as one relevant mechanism through which democratization can affect economic development.

Suggested Citation

  • Delis, Manthos D. & Hasan, Iftekhar & Ongena, Steven, 2018. "Democratic development and credit: "Democracy doesn't come cheap" But at least credit to its corporations will be," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 18/2018, Bank of Finland.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:bofrdp:rdp2018_018
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P27 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Performance and Prospects
    • P47 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Performance and Prospects

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