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Is There Shareholder Expropriation in the United States? An Analysis of Publicly Traded Subsidiaries

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  • Atanasov, Vladimir
  • Boone, Audra
  • Haushalter, David

Abstract

This paper examines the relation between the performance and valuations of publicly traded subsidiaries in the United States and the ownership stake of their parent companies. Cross-sectional and time-series tests demonstrate that subsidiaries of parents that own a substantial minority stake exhibit negative peer-adjusted operating performance and are valued at a 23% median discount relative to peers. In contrast, majority-owned and fully divested subsidiaries show no abnormal performance or valuations. The results of our study indicate that the association between parent ownership and subsidiary performance is nonlinear and that some parents behave opportunistically toward their publicly traded subsidiaries.

Suggested Citation

  • Atanasov, Vladimir & Boone, Audra & Haushalter, David, 2010. "Is There Shareholder Expropriation in the United States? An Analysis of Publicly Traded Subsidiaries," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(1), pages 1-26, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jfinqa:v:45:y:2010:i:01:p:1-26_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yasuharu Aoki, 2014. "How Does the Largest Shareholder Affect Dividends?," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 14(4), pages 613-645, December.
    2. Desai, Chintal A. & Klock, Mark S. & Mansi, Sattar A., 2011. "On the acquisition of equity carve-outs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 3432-3449.
    3. de La Bruslerie, Hubert, 2013. "Equal opportunity rule vs. market rule in transfer of control: How can private benefits help to provide an answer?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 88-107.
    4. Kim, Sojung & Kim, Woochan, 2022. "Tunneling through trademarks," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    5. Xingqiang Du, 2015. "Does Confucianism Reduce Minority Shareholder Expropriation? Evidence from China," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 132(4), pages 661-716, December.
    6. Cao, Mengyi & Xia, Qing, 2021. "Trust and use of covenants," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    7. Xingqiang Du, 2014. "Does Religion Mitigate Tunneling? Evidence from Chinese Buddhism," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 125(2), pages 299-327, December.
    8. Lewis H. K. Tam, 2014. "The impacts of parent’s listing status on subsidiary’s financial constraint and cost of equity capital: the case of equity carve-outs," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 54(1), pages 275-299, March.
    9. Corum, Adrian Aycan & Levit, Doron, 2019. "Corporate control activism," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-17.
    10. Aaron J. Mandell, 2022. "The value of tunneling: Evidence from master limited partnership formations," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1-2), pages 355-380, January.
    11. Konstantinos Konstantaras, & Vasilios Sogiakas, 2014. "The role of convenience yield in going-private transactions," CFI Discussion Papers 1401, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University.

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