Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions?
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Deltas, George & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, 2001. "Auctions with an inexpert bidder," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 35-42, October.
- Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Tröge, Michael, 2011.
"The insider's curse,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 339-350, March.
- Angel Hernando-Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider's Curse," Microeconomics 0503012, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ángel Hernando Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider'S Curse," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Fasten, Erik R. & Hofmann, Dirk, 2010. "Two-sided Certification: The market for Rating Agencies," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 338, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Hanming Fang & Stephen Morris, 2012.
"Multidimensional Private Value Auctions,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Robust Mechanism Design The Role of Private Information and Higher Order Beliefs, chapter 9, pages 319-356,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fang, Hanming & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Multidimensional private value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 1-30, January.
- Hanming Fang & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1423, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Stephen Morris & Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm387, Yale School of Management.
- Stephen Morris & Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 174, Econometric Society.
- Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Theory workshop papers 121473000000000021, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Prüfer, J., 2009.
"Semi-Public Contests,"
Other publications TiSEM
085b0a4f-db2c-46dd-b502-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Prüfer, J., 2009. "Semi-Public Contests," Discussion Paper 2009-33, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- McClellan, Andrew, 2023. "Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 173-180.
- David Malueg & Ram Orzach, 2012. "Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(2), pages 219-254, May.
- Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2020. "Effect of public procurement regulation on competition and cost-effectiveness," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 59-77, August.
- Joel O. Wooten & Joan M. Donohue & Timothy D. Fry & Kathleen M. Whitcomb, 2020. "To Thine Own Self Be True: Asymmetric Information in Procurement Auctions," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(7), pages 1679-1701, July.
- Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
- Larson, Nathan, 2009. "Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 430-460, March.
- Trauten, Andreas & Langer, Thomas, 2007. "Information production and bidding in IPOs: An experimental analysis of auctions and fixed-price offerings," Working Papers 50, University of Münster, Competence Center Internet Economy and Hybrid Systems, European Research Center for Information Systems (ERCIS).
- repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2010-007 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kim, Jinwoo, 2008. "The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 585-595, November.
- Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey Malenko, 2024. "Auctions with Endogenous Initiation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 79(2), pages 1353-1403, April.
- De Silva, Dakshina G. & Dunne, Timothy & Kankanamge, Anuruddha & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2008.
"The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 150-181, January.
- Dakshina De Silva & Timothy Dunne & Anuruddha Kankanamge & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2005. "The Impact of Public Information on Bidding in Highway Procurement Auctions," Microeconomics 0511011, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Fasten, Erik R. & Hofmann, Dirk, 2010. "Two-sided certification: The market for rating agencies," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2010-007, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
- Vasilis Syrgkanis & David Kempe & Eva Tardos, 2019. "Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 1450-1476, November.
- Stylianos Despotakis & Isa Hafalir & R. Ravi & Amin Sayedi, 2017.
"Expertise in Online Markets,"
Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(11), pages 3895-3910, November.
- Stylianos Despotakis & Isa Hafalir & R Ravi & Amin Sayedi, "undated". "Expertise in Online Markets," GSIA Working Papers 2015-E8, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
- Choi, Syngjoo & Guerra, José-Alberto & Kim, Jinwoo, 2019.
"Interdependent value auctions with insider information: Theory and experiment,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 218-237.
- Syngjoo Choi & Jos¢¥e-Alberto Guerra & Jinwoo Kim, 2018. "Interdependent Value Auctions with Insider Information: Theory and Experiment," Working Paper Series no114, Institute of Economic Research, Seoul National University.
- Grosskopf, Brit & Rentschler, Lucas & Sarin, Rajiv, 2018. "An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 40-64.
- Daniel Quint, 2010. "Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(3), pages 469-490, September.
- Kim, Jinwoo & Koh, Youngwoo, 2020. "Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
- Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, 2020. "Effect of Public Procurement Regulation on Competition and Cost-Effectiveness," RSCAS Working Papers 2020/36, European University Institute.
- Mares, Vlad & Harstad, Ronald M., 2003. "Private information revelation in common-value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 264-282, April.
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