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Efficient allocation with continuous quantities

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  • McAfee, R. Preston

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  • McAfee, R. Preston, 1991. "Efficient allocation with continuous quantities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 51-74, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:53:y:1991:i:1:p:51-74
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    Cited by:

    1. Patrick Schmitz, 1998. "Randomization in coalition contracts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 341-353, March.
    2. Fieseler, Karsten & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Moldovanu, Benny, 2003. "Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 223-234, December.
    3. Hu Lu & Jacques Robert, 2000. "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1612, Econometric Society.
    4. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2005. "Mechanism Design with Side Payments: Individual Rationality and Iterative Dominance ( Published in "Journal of Economic Theory" (as a regular article). )," CARF F-Series CARF-F-050, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    5. Zhiling Guo & Gary J. Koehler & Andrew B. Whinston, 2012. "A Computational Analysis of Bundle Trading Markets Design for Distributed Resource Allocation," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 23(3-part-1), pages 823-843, September.
    6. Delacrétaz, David & Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M. & Wilkening, Tom, 2019. "Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 416-454.
    7. Thomas Kittsteiner & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines That Depend on Processing Time," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(2), pages 236-248, February.
    8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
    9. , R., 2008. "Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.
    10. Daske, Thomas, 2019. "Efficient Incentives in Social Networks: "Gamification" and the Coase Theorem," EconStor Preprints 193148, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    11. Vaysman, Igor, 1998. "A model of negotiated transfer pricing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 349-384, June.
    12. Hu Lu & Jacques Robert, 1997. "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-29, CIRANO.
    13. Arijit Sen, 2017. "Symmetry in Bargaining and Efficient Contracts under Asymmetric Information," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 5(2), pages 132-142, December.
    14. Loertscher, Simon & Marx, Leslie M., 2020. "A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 1-15.
    15. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 444-460, April.
    16. Steven R. Williams, 1994. "A Characterization of Efficient," Discussion Papers 1100, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    17. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2007. "Mechanism design with side payments: Individual rationality and iterative dominance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 1-30, March.
    18. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen," MPRA Paper 6930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Widmer, Tobias & Leukel, Joerg, 2016. "Efficiency of electronic service allocation with privately known quality," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 255(3), pages 856-868.
    20. Vijay Krishna & Motty Perry, 1997. "Efficient Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9703010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 28 Apr 1998.
    21. Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2019. "The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 101-106.
    22. Lu, Hu & Robert, Jacques, 2001. "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 50-80, March.
    23. Soumendu Sarkar, 2017. "Mechanism design for land acquisition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 783-812, August.

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