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Implementation via Nash Equilibria

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  • Danilov, Vladimir

Abstract

This paper is concerned with a problem of implementation of a given social choice correspondence. The authors introduces an essential monotonicity condition and show that any implementable social choice correspondence satisfies this condition. Conversely, in a case of three or more participants, any essentially monotone social choice correspondence is implementable. In a case of two participants, the essential monotonicity condition must be completed by a requirement that the social choice correspondence is close to an individually rational correspondence. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.

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  • Danilov, Vladimir, 1992. "Implementation via Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 43-56, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:60:y:1992:i:1:p:43-56
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