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Welfare-improving ambiguity in insurance markets with asymmetric information

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  • Koufopoulos, Kostas
  • Kozhan, Roman

Abstract

We consider a model of competitive insurance markets involving both asymmetric information and ambiguity about the accident probability. We show that there can exist a full-insurance pooling equilibrium. We also present an example where an increase in ambiguity leads to a strict Pareto improvement. Higher ambiguity relaxes high-risks' incentive compatibility constraint and allows low risks to buy more insurance. Higher ambiguity also deteriorates low risks' expected utility from holding an uncertain prospect. If the former effect dominates, the expected utility of low risks increases and given that high risks' utility remains unaffected, the increase in ambiguity implies a strict Pareto improvement.

Suggested Citation

  • Koufopoulos, Kostas & Kozhan, Roman, 2014. "Welfare-improving ambiguity in insurance markets with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 551-560.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:151:y:2014:i:c:p:551-560
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.11.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Jeleva, Meglena & Tallon, Jean-Marc, 2016. "Ambiguïté, comportements et marchés financiers," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 92(1-2), pages 351-383, Mars-Juin.
    2. Wanda Mimra & Achim Wambach, 2019. "Contract withdrawals and equilibrium in competitive markets with adverse selection," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 67(4), pages 875-907, June.
    3. Nihad Aliyev, 2019. "Financial Markets with Multidimensional Uncertainty," PhD Thesis, Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney, number 2-2019, January-A.
    4. Chiara FALCO & Douch KONG & Valentina ROTONDI & Valeria SPELTA, 2016. "Investment, Insurance and Weather Shocks: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in Cambodia," Departmental Working Papers 2016-10, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    5. Falco, Chiara & Rotondi, Valentina & Kong, Douch & Spelta, Valeria, 2021. "Investment, insurance and weather shocks: Evidence from Cambodia," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    6. Mingli Zheng & Chong Wang & Chaozheng Li, 2016. "Insurance Contracts with Adverse Selection When the Insurer Has Ambiguity about the Composition of the Consumers," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 17(1), pages 179-206, May.
    7. Aliyev, Nihad & He, Xue-Zhong, 2023. "Ambiguous price formation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    8. Glenn W. Harrison & Jia Min Ng, 2019. "Behavioral insurance and economic theory: A literature review," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 22(2), pages 133-182, July.
    9. Robin Chark & Vincent Mak & A. V. Muthukrishnan, 2020. "The premium as informational cue in insurance decision making," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 88(3), pages 369-404, April.
    10. Hiroaki Sakamoto, 2014. "Public Bads, Heterogeneous Beliefs, and the Value of Information," Discussion papers e-13-009, Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University.
    11. Takaaki Hamada, 2023. "Endogenous timing in tax competition: The effect of asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(3), pages 570-614, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ambiguity aversion; Asymmetric information; Welfare improvement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies

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