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Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition

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  • Eichner, Thomas
  • Pethig, Rüdiger

Abstract

In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition.

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  • Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Rüdiger, 2019. "Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 27-53.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:94:y:2019:i:c:p:27-53
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002
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    Cited by:

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    3. Bai, Caiquan & Xie, Dongshui & Zhang, Yuwei, 2024. "Industrial land transfer and enterprise pollution emissions: Evidence from China," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 181-194.
    4. Ogawa, Hikaru, 2021. "Partial environmental tax coordination and political delegation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    5. Michael S. Michael & Panos Hatzipanayotou & Nikos Tsakiris, 2023. "Can Small Economies Act Strategically? The Case of Consumption Pollution and Non-tradable Goods," DEOS Working Papers 2312, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    6. Yuping Deng & Yanrui Wu & Helian Xu, 2022. "Emission Reduction and Value-added Export Nexus at Firm Level," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 22-19, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
    7. Nikos Tsakiris & Panos Hatzipanayotou & Michael S. Michael, 2022. "Tradable Emission Permits and Strategic Capital Taxation," DEOS Working Papers 2201, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    8. Cheng, Haitao, 2024. "Domestic versus international emissions trading with capital mobility," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    9. Nikos Tsakiris & Panos Hatzipanayotou & Michael S. Michael, 2024. "Strategic capital taxation, tradable emission permits and global pollution," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(1), pages 276-296, February.
    10. Kollenbach, Gilbert & Schopf, Mark, 2022. "Unilaterally optimal climate policy and the green paradox," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    11. Deng, Yaling & You, Daming & Wang, Jingjing, 2022. "Research on the nonlinear mechanism underlying the effect of tax competition on green technology innovation - An analysis based on the dynamic spatial Durbin model and the threshold panel model," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Decentralized policymaking; Capital tax; Emissions tax; Emissions cap; Pollution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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