The Regulation of Environmental Innovations
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996.
"Pollution permits and compliance strategies,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 85-125, October.
- J-J. Laffont & J. Tirole, 1994. "Pollution Permits and Compliance Strategies," Working papers 95-9, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Pollution Permits and Compliance Strategies," IDEI Working Papers 39, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Laffont, J.J. & Tirole, J., 1995. "Pollution Permits and Compliance Strategies," Papers 95.395, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Martin L. Weitzman, 1980.
"The "Ratchet Principle" and Performance Incentives,"
Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 302-308, Spring.
- M. Weitzman, 1979. "The 'Ratchet Principle' and Performance Incentives," Working papers 239, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994.
"The Management of Innovation,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 1185-1209.
- Aghion, P. & Tirole, J., 1993. "On the Management of Innovation," Working papers 93-12, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "On the Management of Innovation," IDEI Working Papers 36, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1980. "On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 47(5), pages 857-860.
- R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1987. "Competition for Agency Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 296-307, Summer.
- Segerson, Kathleen, 1988.
"Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 87-98, March.
- Segerson, Kathleen, 1985. "Uncertainty And Incentives For Nonpoint Pollution Control," 1985 Annual Meeting, August 4-7, Ames, Iowa 278615, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Xepapadeas, A. P., 1992. "Environmental policy design and dynamic nonpoint-source pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 22-39, July.
- Evan Kwerel, 1977. "To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 595-601.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1987.
"Auctioning Incentive Contracts,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 921-937, October.
- Jean-Jaques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Working papers 403, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Jean Tirole, 1999. "Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 741-782, July.
- Baron, David P. & Besanko, David, 1984. "Regulation and information in a continuing relationship," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 267-302.
- Mathias Dewatripont, 1989. "Renegotiation and Information Revelation Over Time: The Case of Optimal Labor Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(3), pages 589-619.
- Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March.
- R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1986. "Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 326-338, Autumn.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996.
"Pollution permits and environmental innovation,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 127-140, October.
- Laffont, J.J. & Tirole, J., 1995. "Pollution Permits and Environmental Innovation," Papers 95.396, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Oliver D. Hart & Jean Tirole, 1988.
"Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(4), pages 509-540.
- Oliver D. Hart & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Working papers 442, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Benford, Frank A., 1998. "On the Dynamics of the Regulation of Pollution: Incentive Compatible Regulation of a Persistent Pollutant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 1-25, July.
- McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987.
"Auctions and Bidding,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
- R Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1986. "Auctions and Bidding," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 8601, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1981.
"Optimal Auction Design,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 6(1), pages 58-73, February.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Riordan, Michael H & Sappington, David E M, 1987. "Awarding Monopoly Franchises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 375-387, June.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Mehdi Fadaee & Luca Lambertini, 2015.
"Non-tradeable pollution permits as green R&D incentives,"
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 17(1), pages 27-42, January.
- Mehdi Fadaee & Luca Lambertini, 2012. "Non-Tradeable Pollution Permits as Green R&D Incentives," Working Paper series 43_12, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
- M. Fadaee, 2011. "A Dynamic Approach to the Environmental Effects of Trade Liberalization," Working Papers wp746, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Dragone, Davide & Lambertini, Luca & Palestini, Arsen, 2014.
"Regulating Environmental Externalities through Public Firms: A Differential Game,"
Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 4(1), pages 15-40, April.
- D. Dragone & L. Lambertini & A. Palestini, 2011. "Regulating Environmental Externalities through Public Firms: A Differential Game," Working Papers wp738, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Helm Carsten & Schöttner Anja, 2008.
"Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R&D Spillovers,"
German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 339-353, August.
- Carsten Helm & Anja Schöttner, 2008. "Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R&D Spillovers," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9(3), pages 339-353, August.
- Helm, Carsten & Schöttner, Anja, 2005. "Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R&D Spillovers," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 36798, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
- Helm, Carsten & Schöttner, Anja, 2009. "Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R&D Spillovers," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) 77403, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL).
- Helm, Carsten & Schöttner, Anja, 2005. "Subsidizing technological innovations in the presence of R&D spillovers," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 154, Darmstadt University of Technology, Department of Law and Economics.
- repec:bla:germec:v:9:y:2008:i::p:339-353 is not listed on IDEAS
- Prieur, Fabien & Tidball, Mabel & Withagen, Cees, 2013.
"Optimal emission-extraction policy in a world of scarcity and irreversibility,"
Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 637-658.
- Fabien Prieur & Mabel Tidball & Cees A. Withagen, 2011. "Optimal Emission-Extraction Policy in a World of Scarcity and Irreversibility," CESifo Working Paper Series 3512, CESifo.
- Mabel Tidball, 2011. "Optimal emission-extraction policy in a world of scarcity and irreversibility [Politique optimale d'émission/extraction dans dans un monde de rareté et d’irréversibilité]," Post-Print hal-02807037, HAL.
- Fabien Priuer & Mabel Tidball & Cees Withagen, 2011. "Optimal Emission-Extraction Policy in a World of Scarcity and Irreversibility," OxCarre Working Papers 077, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
- Yacov Tsur & Amos Zemel, 2008.
"Regulating environmental threats,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 39(3), pages 297-310, March.
- Tsur, Yacov & Zemel, Amos, 2006. "Regulating Environmental Threats," Discussion Papers 7150, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Agricultural Economics and Management.
- M. Fadaee & L. Lambertini, 2011. "Using Auctions for Pollution Rights as Indirect Incentives for Investments in Green Technologies," Working Papers wp729, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Tsur, Yacov & Zemel, Amos, 2007. "Towards endogenous recombinant growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(11), pages 3459-3477, November.
- Sean D'Evelyn, 2010. "Green Research Grants," Working Papers 2010-15, University of Hawaii Economic Research Organization, University of Hawaii at Manoa.
- Toxvaerd, Flavio, 2007.
"A theory of optimal deadlines,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 493-513, February.
- Flavio Toxvaerd, 2003. "A Theory of Optimal Deadlines," Discussion Paper Series dp357, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Committee, Nobel Prize, 2014. "Market power and regulation (scientific background)," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2014-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
- Benford, Frank A., 1998. "On the Dynamics of the Regulation of Pollution: Incentive Compatible Regulation of a Persistent Pollutant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 1-25, July.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1988.
"Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment, and Bidding Parity with an Application to Takeovers,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(4), pages 516-537, Winter.
- Jean Tirole & Jean-Jaques Laffont, 1987. "Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment and Bidding Parity With an Application to Takeovers," Working papers 463, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Laffont, J. J. & Tirole, J., 1988. "Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment and Bidding Parity with an Application to Takeovers," Working Papers 675, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Spaeter, Sandrine & Verchère, Alban, 2004.
"Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de l’eau,"
Cahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 71.
- Sandrine Spaeter & Alban Verchère, 2004. "Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de l’eau," Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 71, pages 5-35.
- Sandrine SPAETER & Alban VERCHERE, 2002. "Aléa moral et politiques d'audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d'origine agricole de l'eau," Working Papers of BETA 2002-16, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
- Jean Tirole, 2016.
"From Bottom of the Barrel to Cream of the Crop: Sequential Screening With Positive Selection,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84(4), pages 1291-1343, July.
- Jean Tirole, 2016. "From Bottom of the Barrel to Cream of the Crop: Sequential Screening With Positive Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1291-1343, July.
- Tirole, Jean, 2016. "From Bottom of the Barrel to Cream of the Crop: Sequential Screening with Positive Selection," TSE Working Papers 16-672, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Stanley Baiman & Paul Fischer & Madhav V. Rajan & Richard Saouma, 2007. "Resource Allocation Auctions within Firms," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(5), pages 915-946, December.
- Seung Han Yoo, 2017. "Optimal Design for an Informed Auctioneer," Discussion Paper Series 1702, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
- McGuire, Thomas G. & Riordan, Michael H., 1995.
"Incomplete information and optimal market structure public purchases from private providers,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 125-141, January.
- Thomas G. McGuire & Michael H. Riordan, 1991. "Incomplete Information and Optimal Market Structure: Public Purchases from Private Providers," Papers 0010, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Sandrine Spaeter & Alban Verchère, 2004. "Agricultural pollution of water, moral hazard and optimal audit policies [Aléa moral et politiques d’audit optimales dans le cadre de la pollution d’origine agricole de l’eau]," Post-Print hal-01201071, HAL.
- Candel-Sanchez, Francisco, 2006. "The externalities problem of transboundary and persistent pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 517-526, July.
- Indranil Chakraborty & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2021.
"Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 179-206, March.
- Indranil Chakraborty & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2021. "Competitive Procurement With Ex Post Moral Hazard," CESifo Working Paper Series 8863, CESifo.
- François MARECHAL, 2003. "Should we base procurement rules on the competition of linear incentive contracts ?," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 03.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017.
"A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 816-852.
- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2013. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," Working Papers E1304E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," Post-Print halshs-01509602, HAL.
- David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01509602, HAL.
- Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2014. "A Theory of Contracts With Limited Enforcement," MPRA Paper 53504, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- JunJie Wu & Bruce Babcock, 2001.
"Spatial Heterogeneity and the Choice of Instruments to Control Nonpoint Pollution,"
Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 18(2), pages 173-192, February.
- JunJie Wu & Bruce A. Babcock, 1996. "Spatial Heterogeneity and the Choice of Instruments to Control Nonpoint Pollution," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 96-wp164, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
- Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 2001. "Spatial Heterogeneity and the Choice of Instruments to Control Nonpoint Pollution," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1012, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Wu, JunJie & Babcock, Bruce A., 2001. "Spatial Heterogeneity and the Choice of Instruments to Control Nonpoint Pollution," ISU General Staff Papers 200101010800001192, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1994.
"The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 507-537, May.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1992. "The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After," IDEI Working Papers 22, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Branco, Fernando, 2002. "Procurement favouritism and technology adoption," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 73-91, January.
- Sherman, Roger, 1989. "Institutional design for monopoly regulation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 5(2-3), pages 245-257.
- Rosar, Frank, 2017. "Strategic outsourcing and optimal procurement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 91-130.
- Battaglini, Marco, 2007.
"Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 213-246, August.
- Battaglini, Marco, 2005. "Optimality and Renegotiation in Dynamic Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 5014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- B. Caillaud & R. Guesnerie & P. Rey & J. Tirole, 1988.
"Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
- Bernard Caillaud & Patrick Rey & Roger Guesnerie & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions," Working papers 472, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:44:y:2002:i:2:p:242-260. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.