Voluntary Auctions for Noxious Facilities: Incentives to Participate and the Efficiency of Siting Decisions
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Cited by:
- Eli Feinerman & Israel Finkelshtain & Iddo Kan, 2004.
"On A Political Solution to the NIMBY Conflict,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 369-381, March.
- Feinerman, Eli & Finkelshtain, Israel & Kan, Iddo, 2003. "On A Political Solution To The Nimby Conflict," Discussion Papers 15000, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Department of Agricultural Economics and Management.
- Roberta Occhilupo & Giuliana Palumbo & Paolo Sestito, 2011. "Siting public facilities: a theoretical and empirical analysis of the Nimby syndrome in Italy," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 91, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2000. "In whose backyard? A generalized bidding approach," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 463.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy & Leroux, Justin, 2011.
"Choosing and sharing,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 296-300, September.
- Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti & Justin Leroux, 2007. "Choosing and Sharing," Cahiers de recherche 07-13, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
- Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy & Leroux, Justin, 2009. "Choosing and Sharing," MPRA Paper 14929, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Nicolas Marchetti, 2004. "Face to Face Negotiation to Overcome the Nimby Syndrome: Theory and Experimental Design," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-53, CIRANO.
- Martin Besfamille & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2010.
"NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(2), pages 114-132, April.
- Martin Besfamille & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2008. "NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints," Department of Economics Working Papers 2008-11, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
- Pérez-Castrillo, David & Quérou, Nicolas, 2012.
"Smooth multibidding mechanisms,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 420-438.
- David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolas Quérou, 2010. "Smooth multibidding mechanisms," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 849.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolas Quérou, 2011. "Smooth Multibidding Mechanisms," CESifo Working Paper Series 3394, CESifo.
- David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolas Quérou, 2010. "Smooth Multibidding Mechanisms," Working Papers 520, Barcelona School of Economics.
- Bruno Frey & Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, 2004.
"Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, but Also How Matters,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(3), pages 377-401, September.
- Bruno S. Frey & Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, "undated". "Introducing Procedural Utility: Not only What, but also How Matters," IEW - Working Papers 129, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Bruno S. Frey & Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, 2003. "Introducing Procedural Utility: Not only What, but also How Matters," CREMA Working Paper Series 2003-02, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Keith Waehrer, 2003.
"Hazardous Facility Siting When Cost Information Is Private: An Application of Multidimensional Mechanism Design,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(4), pages 605-622, October.
- Keith Waehrer, 1997. "Hazardous Facility Siting When Cost Information is Private: An Application of Multidimensional Mechanism Design," Game Theory and Information 9702004, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 May 1997.
- Lejano, Raul P. & Davos, Climis A., 2002. "Fair Share: Siting Noxious Facilities as a Risk Distribution Game under Nontransferable Utility," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 251-266, March.
- Per Fredriksson, 2000. "The Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities in Federal Systems: The Political Economy of NIMBY," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 15(1), pages 75-87, January.
- Laura Abrardi & Luca Colombo & Pier Angelo Mori, 2016.
"Customer Ownership And Quality Provision In Public Services Under Asymmetric Information,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(3), pages 1499-1518, July.
- Laura Abrardi & Luca Colombo & Pier Angelo Mori, 2014. "Customer Ownership and Quality Provision in Public Services under Asymmetric Information," Euricse Working Papers 1467, Euricse (European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises).
- Jeremy Laurent-lucchetti & Justin Leroux, 2010. "Lindahl prices solve the NIMBY problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(3), pages 2457-2463.
- Robin R. Jenkins & Kelly B. Maguire & Cynthia L. Morgan, 2004.
"Host Community Compensation and Municipal Solid Waste Landfills,"
Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 80(4).
- Cynthia Morgan & Kelly B. Maguire & Robin R. Jenkins, 2002. "Host Community Compensation and Municipal Solid Waste Landfills," NCEE Working Paper Series 200204, National Center for Environmental Economics, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, revised Aug 2002.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2003:i:22:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
- Róbert Veszteg, 2010.
"Multibidding game under uncertainty,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 14(3), pages 311-329, September.
- Róbert F. Veszteg, 2004. "Multibidding Game under Uncertainty," Faculty Working Papers 14/04, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
- Perez-Castrillo, David & Veszteg, Robert F., 2007. "Choosing a common project: Experimental evidence on the multibidding mechanism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 394-411, July.
- Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy & Leroux, Justin, 2009. "Axiomatic foundation for Lindahl pricing in the NIMBY context," MPRA Paper 14930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Minehart, Deborah & Neeman, Zvika, 2002. "Effective Siting of Waste Treatment Facilities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 303-324, March.
- David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2002. "Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1577-1587, December.
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