Too many or too few? On the optimal number of firms in the commons
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102825
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- Luca Colombo & Paola Labrecciosa & Leo Simon, 2023. "Too many or too few? On the optimal number of firms in the commons," Post-Print hal-04207035, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- repec:bla:econom:v:53:y:1986:i:212:p:519-27 is not listed on IDEAS
- Karp, Larry, 1992. "Social Welfare in a Common Property Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(2), pages 353-372, May.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F & Stokey, Nancy L, 1985. "Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(1), pages 161-173, February.
- David Levhari & Leonard J. Mirman, 1980. "The Great Fish War: An Example Using a Dynamic Cournot-Nash Solution," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 322-334, Spring.
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More about this item
Keywords
Common-pool resources; Differential games; Optimal number of firms; Oligopoly; Social welfare;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
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