Who will monitor the monitors? Informal law enforcement and collusion at Champagne
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.05.017
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Cited by:
- Mika Kallioinen, 2017. "Inter‐communal institutions in medieval trade," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1131-1152, November.
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More about this item
Keywords
Collusion; Institutions; Monitors; Competition; Guilds; Champagne fairs; Medieval Europe;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- N23 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: Pre-1913
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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