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Learning by helping: a bounded rationality model of mentoring

Author

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  • Arai, Mahmood
  • Billot, Antoine
  • Lanfranchi, Joseph

Abstract

Within an organization, a bounded rational principal organizes a promotion test based on a sequence of test regarding candidates' relative performances. We assume the principal to suffer from limited ability to rank the performances, only identifying the best in each test. Furthermore, he satisfies the expected gains do not decreases whit the information generated by additional tests. Then, mentoring is shown to improve the information about candidates' ability when the principal offers help to the current best candidate provided by a manager promoted after a similar contest.
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Suggested Citation

  • Arai, Mahmood & Billot, Antoine & Lanfranchi, Joseph, 2001. "Learning by helping: a bounded rationality model of mentoring," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 113-132, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:45:y:2001:i:2:p:113-132
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    1. Margaret A. Meyer, 1991. "Learning from Coarse Information: Biased Contests and Career Profiles," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(1), pages 15-41.
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    5. Laband, David N. & Piette, Michael J., 1995. "Team production in economics: division of labor or mentoring?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 33-40, March.
    6. Drago, Robert & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 1991. "Competition and cooperation in the workplace," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 347-364, May.
    7. Valsecchi, Irene, 1996. "Policing Team Production through Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 361-375, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arai, Mahmood & Bursell, Moa & Nekby, Lena, 2008. "Between Meritocracy and Ethnic Discrimination: The Gender Difference," SULCIS Working Papers 2008:2, Stockholm University, Linnaeus Center for Integration Studies - SULCIS.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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