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Product risk sharing by warranties in a monopoly market with risk-averse consumers

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  • Boom, Anette

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  • Boom, Anette, 1998. "Product risk sharing by warranties in a monopoly market with risk-averse consumers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 241-257, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:33:y:1998:i:2:p:241-257
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Emons, Winand, 1989. "The Theory of Warranty Contracts," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 43-57.
    2. Philip H. Dybvig & Nancy A. Lutz, 1993. "Warranties, Durability, and Maintenance: Two-sided Moral Hazard in a Continuous-Time Model," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(3), pages 575-597.
    3. Schlesinger, Harris, 1985. "Product safety for a monopolist under strict liability," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 253-261, October.
    4. A. Mitchell Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, 1983. "Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 581-589, Autumn.
    5. Michael Spence, 1977. "Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 561-572.
    6. Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1985. "Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 103-113, Spring.
    7. Duncan P. Mann & Jennifer P. Wissink, 1988. "Money-Back Contracts with Double Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 285-292, Summer.
    8. Walter Y. Oi, 1973. "The Economics of Product Safety," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 4(1), pages 3-28, Spring.
    9. Geoffrey Heal, 1977. "Guarantees and Risk-Sharing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 549-560.
    10. Nancy A. Lutz, 1989. "Warranties as Signals under Consumer Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 239-255, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tsvetanov, Tsvetan & Miceli, Thomas J. & Segerson, Kathleen, 2021. "Products liability with temptation bias," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 76-93.
    2. Esmaeili, M. & Shamsi Gamchi, N. & Asgharizadeh, E., 2014. "Three-level warranty service contract among manufacturer, agent and customer: A game-theoretical approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 239(1), pages 177-186.
    3. Dinopoulos, Elias & Livanis, Grigorios T. & West, Carol Taylor, 2005. "How Cool is C.O.O.L.?," Working Papers 15658, University of Florida, International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center.
    4. Dinopoulos, Elias & Livanis, Grigorios & West, Carol, 2010. "Country of Origin Labeling (C.O.O.L.): How cool is it?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 575-589, October.
    5. Moura, Márcio das Chagas & Santana, João Mateus & Droguett, Enrique López & Lins, Isis Didier & Guedes, Bruno Nunes, 2017. "Analysis of extended warranties for medical equipment: A Stackelberg game model using priority queues," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 338-354.
    6. Nikunja Mohan Modak & Shibaji Panda & Shib Sankar Sana, 2015. "Managing a two-echelon supply chain with price, warranty and quality dependent demand," Cogent Business & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 1011014-101, December.
    7. Murthy, D. N. P. & Djamaludin, I., 2002. "New product warranty: A literature review," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 231-260, October.
    8. Bhargava, Hemant K. & Sun, Daewon, 2008. "Pricing under quality of service uncertainty: Market segmentation via statistical QoS guarantees," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 191(3), pages 1189-1204, December.

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