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Degree of supervision, moral hazard, and hierarchical control

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  • Yang, Yeong Ling

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  • Yang, Yeong Ling, 1995. "Degree of supervision, moral hazard, and hierarchical control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 93-105, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:26:y:1995:i:1:p:93-105
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yang, Yeong Ling, 1991. "Incentive policy in agency theory: A review," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 283-293.
    2. Oliver E. Williamson, 1967. "Hierarchical Control and Optimum Firm Size," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75(2), pages 123-123.
    3. Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
    4. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    5. Calvo, Guillermo A & Wellisz, Stanislaw, 1978. "Supervision, Loss of Control, and the Optimum Size of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(5), pages 943-952, October.
    6. Michael Keren & David Levhari, 1979. "The Optimum Span of Control in a Pure Hierarchy," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(11), pages 1162-1172, November.
    7. Calvo, Guillermo A & Wellisz, Stanislaw, 1979. "Hierarchy, Ability, and Income Distribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 991-1010, October.
    8. HOLMSTROM, Bengt, 1979. "Moral hazard and observability," LIDAM Reprints CORE 379, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    Cited by:

    1. Neunzig, Alexander R., 2002. "Effiziente Fixlohnverträge für arbeitsfreudige Arbeitnehmer mit Berichtspflichten," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2002-05, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
    2. Emma Hubert, 2023. "Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 605-661, July.
    3. Emma Hubert, 2020. "Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies," Papers 2007.10758, arXiv.org.
    4. Lampel, Joseph & Miller, Roger & Floricel, Serghei, 1996. "Impact of owner involvement on innovation in large projects: Lessons from power plants construction," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 5(6), pages 561-578, December.

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