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Theory of the firm and structure of residual rights

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  • Yang, Xiaokai
  • Ng, Yew-Kwang

Abstract

The following sections are included:IntroductionA Model with Intermediate GoodsConfiguration and Corner Solution versus Market Structure and Corner EquilibriumStructure of Residual Rights, Economies of Specialization, Economies of Division of Labor, and Economies of the FirmImplications and ConclusionsAppendix: Proof of Proposition 1References
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  • Yang, Xiaokai & Ng, Yew-Kwang, 1995. "Theory of the firm and structure of residual rights," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 107-128, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:26:y:1995:i:1:p:107-128
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    1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-641, June.
    3. Xiaokai Yang, 2006. "Development, Structural Changes And Urbanization," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Christis Tombazos & Xiaokai Yang (ed.), Inframarginal Contributions To Development Economics, chapter 7, pages 137-166, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Cheung, Steven N S, 1983. "The Contractual Nature of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, April.
    5. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    6. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-991, September.
    7. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    8. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1991. "Technological Change and the Boundaries of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 887-900, September.
    9. Xiaokai Yang & Jeff Borland, 2005. "A Microeconomic Mechanism For Economic Growth," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: An Inframarginal Approach To Trade Theory, chapter 18, pages 409-436, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    10. repec:bla:econom:v:49:y:1982:i:194:p:121-39 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    12. Frank H. Knight, 1925. "On Decreasing Cost and Comparative Cost: A Rejoinder," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 39(2), pages 331-333.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Jeffrey Sachs & Xiaokai Yang & Dingsheng Zhang, 2005. "Pattern Of Trade And Economic Development In A Model Of Monopolistic Competition," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: An Inframarginal Approach To Trade Theory, chapter 10, pages 185-221, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Jeffrey Sachs & Wing Thye Woo & Xiaokai Yang, 2000. "Economic Reforms and Constitutional Transition," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 1(2), pages 423-479, November.
    3. Pak-Wai Liu & Xiaokai Yang, 1999. "Division of Labor, Transaction Cost, Emergence of the Firm and Firm Size," CID Working Papers 10, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    4. Xiaokai Yang, 2000. "Incomplete Contingent Labor Contract, Asymmetric Residual Rights and Authority, and the Theory of the Firm," CID Working Papers 45, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    5. Guangzhen Sun & Xiaokai Yang & Shuntian Yao, 1999. "Theoretical Foundation of Economic Development Based on Networking Decisions in the Competitive Market," CID Working Papers 16, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    6. Pak-Wai Liu & Xiaokai Yang, 2006. "The Theory Of Irrelevance Of The Size Of The Firm," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Christis Tombazos & Xiaokai Yang (ed.), Inframarginal Contributions To Development Economics, chapter 11, pages 259-290, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. W. Max Corden & Peter Forsyth & Christis G. Tombazos, 2008. "Distinguished Fellow of the Economic Society of Australia, 2007: Yew‐Kwang Ng," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 84(265), pages 267-272, June.
    8. Limin Gao & Sajid Anwar, 2024. "Labour market rigidity and firm innovation," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 237-257, June.
    9. Xiaokai Yang, 1994. "Endogenous vs. exogenous comparative advantage and economies of specialization vs. economies of scale," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 29-54, February.
    10. Sun, Guang-Zhen & Yang, Xiaokai & Zhou, Lin, 2004. "General equilibria in large economies with endogenous structure of division of labor," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 237-256, October.
    11. Duanmu, Jing-Lin, 2014. "A race to lower standards? Labor standards and location choice of outward FDI from the BRIC countries," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 620-634.
    12. Li, Shuhe & Zhang, Weiying, 2001. "Optimal assignment of principalship in teams," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 105-127, January.
    13. Haiou Zhou, 2009. "Evolutionary Dynamics of the Market Equilibrium with Division of Labor∗," Monash Economics Working Papers 12-09, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    14. Zhang, Yongsheng & Zhao, Xueyan, 2004. "Testing the scale effect predicted by the Fujita-Krugman urbanization model," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 207-222, October.
    15. Li, Yanfei & Yao, Shuntian & Chia, Wai-Mun, 2009. "Endogenous Firm and Information Rent Under Demand Uncertainty," MPRA Paper 13506, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Feb 2009.
    16. Russell Smyth & Dic Lo, 2000. "Theories of the Firm and the Relationship between Different Perspectives on the Division of Labour," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(3), pages 333-349.
    17. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 2001. "On synergies and vertical integration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1281-1295, September.
    18. Cheng, Wenli & Yang, Xiaokai, 2004. "Inframarginal analysis of division of labor: A survey," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 137-174, October.
    19. Qiangqiang Zhang & Beibei Yan & Xuexi Huo, 2018. "What Are the Effects of Participation in Production Outsourcing? Evidence from Chinese Apple Farmers," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(12), pages 1-15, November.

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    JEL classification:

    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • O21 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Planning Models; Planning Policy
    • O23 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development

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