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Piracy, Inc.—on the bearing of the firm analogy to pirate organization

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  • Per Bylund

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  • Per Bylund, 2010. "Piracy, Inc.—on the bearing of the firm analogy to pirate organization," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 23(3), pages 299-305, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:23:y:2010:i:3:p:299-305
    DOI: 10.1007/s11138-010-0106-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    3. F. A. Hayek, 2005. "The Use of Knowledge in Society," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Guang-Zhen Sun (ed.), Readings In The Economics Of The Division Of Labor The Classical Tradition, chapter 25, pages 270-284, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    5. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    6. Burress, Molly J. & Cook, Michael L., 2009. "A Primer On Collective Entrepreneurship: A Preliminary Taxonomy," Working Papers 92628, University of Missouri Columbia, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    7. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    8. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1994. "The Firm as an Incentive System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 972-991, September.
    9. Cook, Michael L. & Plunkett, Brad, 2006. "Collective Entrepreneurship: An Emerging Phenomenon in Producer-Owned Organizations," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 421-428, August.
    10. Hansmann, Henry, 1988. "Ownership of the Firm," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(2), pages 267-304, Fall.
    11. Cook, Michael L. & Plunkett, Brad, 2006. "Collective Entrepreneurship: An Emerging Phenomenon in Producer-Owned Organizations," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 38(2), pages 1-8, August.
    12. Hayek, F. A., 2012. "New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics, and the History of Ideas," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226321288, December.
    13. William M. Dugger, 1996. "The Mechanisms of Governance," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(4), pages 1212-1216, December.
    14. Oliver E. Williamson & Michael L. Wachter & Jeffrey E. Harris, 1975. "Understanding the Employment Relation: The Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(1), pages 250-278, Spring.
    15. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1049-1094, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paul Walker, 2016. "Simple Models of a Human-Capital-Based Firm: a Reference Point Approach," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 7(1), pages 219-247, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Theory of the firm; Organization; Ownership; Pirates; D21; J54; L10; L22; L23; Q13;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • J54 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Producer Cooperatives; Labor Managed Firms
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
    • Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness

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