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The selection effect of quota rationing mechanisms on sales distribution: The convergence of auction and lottery

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  • Hu, Mantian
  • Xiao, Junji
  • Zheng, Bingyong

Abstract

Rationing mechanisms are widely used to allocate scarce resources caused by policy intervention. The effect of rationing on equilibrium usually depends on the rationing mechanism. However, stylized facts in the Chinese passenger vehicle market suggest that the quota on license plates shifts vehicle demand to the high-price end, regardless of whether rationing occurs through an auction or a lottery. This study provides a unified theoretical explanation and an empirical analysis for this finding. When the quota allocation process incurs opportunity costs, only the consumers with a high willingness-to-pay participate in the process, which shifts sales distribution to the high-price end.

Suggested Citation

  • Hu, Mantian & Xiao, Junji & Zheng, Bingyong, 2022. "The selection effect of quota rationing mechanisms on sales distribution: The convergence of auction and lottery," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 803-819.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:200:y:2022:i:c:p:803-819
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.06.020
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    1. Zhi-Chun Li Author-Name : Wen-Jing Liu Author-Name : André de Palma, "undated". "Spatial heterogeneity in vehicle license plate lottery rationing," THEMA Working Papers 2024-11, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.

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