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Have your lawyer call my lawyer : Bilateral delegation in bargaining situations

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  • Jones, Stephen R. G.

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  • Jones, Stephen R. G., 1989. "Have your lawyer call my lawyer : Bilateral delegation in bargaining situations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 159-174, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:11:y:1989:i:2:p:159-174
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    Cited by:

    1. Kai A. Konrad & Marcel Thum, 2020. "Equilibrium opacity in ultimatum‐offer bargaining," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1515-1529, September.
    2. Arvaniti, Maria & Habla, Wolfgang, 2021. "The political economy of negotiating international carbon markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    3. Björn Bartling & Urs Fischbacher, 2012. "Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(1), pages 67-87.
    4. Alessandro Tavoni & Ralph Winkler, 2021. "Domestic Pressure and International Climate Cooperation," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 225-243, October.
    5. Habla, Wolfgang & Winkler, Ralph, 2018. "Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 244-250.
    6. Paola Conconi & Giovanni Facchini & Maurizio Zanardi, 2012. "Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 146-189, August.
    7. Schotter, Andrew & Zheng, Wei & Snyder, Blaine, 2000. "Bargaining Through Agents: An Experimental Study of Delegation and Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 248-292, February.
    8. Facchini, Giovanni & Silva, Peri & Willmann, Gerald, 2013. "The customs union issue: Why do we observe so few of them?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 136-147.
    9. Barbara Dluhosch & Nikolai Ziegler, 2011. "The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 325-354, December.
    10. Harstad, Bård, 2010. "Strategic delegation and voting rules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 102-113, February.
    11. Gaston, Noel, 1997. "Efficiency wages, managerial discretion, and the fear of bankruptcy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 41-59, May.
    12. Chakravorty Shourjo, 2019. "Representation in Multi-Issue Delegated Bargaining," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 1-12, January.
    13. Daniel Cardona & Clara Ponsatí, 2015. "Representing a democratic constituency in negotiations: delegation versus ratification," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(2), pages 399-414, September.
    14. Segendorff, Bjorn, 1998. "Delegation and Threat in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 266-283, May.
    15. Siqueira, Kevin, 2003. "International externalities, strategic interaction, and domestic politics," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 674-691, May.
    16. Matthew O. Jackson & Massimo Morelli, 2011. "The Reasons for Wars: An Updated Survey," Chapters, in: Christopher J. Coyne & Rachel L. Mathers (ed.), The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    17. Paolo Balduzzi, 2004. "Delegation Games with Full Commitment," Working Papers 70, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2004.
    18. Spycher, Sarah & Winkler, Ralph, 2022. "Strategic delegation in the formation of modest international environmental agreements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    19. Amin, Mohammad & Mattoo, Aaditya, 2006. "Can guest worker schemes reduce illegal migration ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3828, The World Bank.
    20. Jansen, Jos, 2003. "Coexistence of strategic vertical separation and integration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 699-716, May.
    21. Eckert, Heather, 2003. "Negotiating environmental agreements: Regional or federal authority?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-24, July.
    22. Roland Kirstein, 2009. "Optimal Delegation in Nash Bargaining," FEMM Working Papers 09001, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.

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