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Critical junctures and economic development – Evidence from the adoption of constitutions among American Indian Nations

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  • Akee, Randall
  • Jorgensen, Miriam
  • Sunde, Uwe

Abstract

Utilizing a novel data set on American Indian Nations, we investigate how conditions at critical junctures of development can have long-lasting economic effects. We investigate the effect of the party of the US President at the time when American Indian tribes adopt a written constitution for the first time. Our results indicate that there is a persistent effect on economic development, even after controlling for other important characteristics and conducting extensive robustness checks. We also find suggestive evidence for the constitutional design, and specifically whether the chief executive is elected directly or indirectly, being a likely channel through which the presidential party affects long-run economic development.

Suggested Citation

  • Akee, Randall & Jorgensen, Miriam & Sunde, Uwe, 2015. "Critical junctures and economic development – Evidence from the adoption of constitutions among American Indian Nations," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 844-861.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:43:y:2015:i:4:p:844-861
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2015.08.004
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    Cited by:

    1. Laurel Wheeler, 2023. "More than Chance: The Local Labor Market Effects of Tribal Gaming," Working Papers 23-22, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    2. Ennio E. Piano & Louis Rouanet, 2024. "The calculus of american indian consent: the law and economics of tribal constitutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 199(3), pages 341-366, June.
    3. Donn L Feir & Rob Gillezeau & Maggie E C Jones, 2024. "The Slaughter of the Bison and Reversal of Fortunes on the Great Plains," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(3), pages 1634-1670.
    4. Donn Feir & Rob Gillezeau & Maggie Jones, 2017. "The Slaughter of the North American Bison and Reversal of Fortunes on the Great Plains," Department Discussion Papers 1701, Department of Economics, University of Victoria.
    5. Jordan Karl Lofthouse, 2019. "Culture and Native American economic development," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 9(1), pages 21-39, November.
    6. Jordan K. Lofthouse, 2019. "Liberty versus Bureaucracy on Native American Lands," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 34(Spring 20), pages 87-101.
    7. Gregg, Matthew T., 2018. "The long-term effects of American Indian boarding schools," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 17-32.
    8. Rebecca Cordell & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Florian G Kern & Laura Saavedra-Lux, 2020. "Measuring institutional variation across American Indian constitutions using automated content analysis," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 57(6), pages 777-788, November.
    9. Leonard, Bryan & Parker, Dominic P. & Anderson, Terry L., 2020. "Land quality, land rights, and indigenous poverty," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(C).
    10. Laurel Wheeler, 2019. "Property Rights, Place-Based Policies, and Economic Development," Working Papers 19-16, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    11. Kodila-Tedika, Oasis & Mulunda Kabange, Martin, 2018. "Constitutional instability and Poverty: Some Empirical Evidence," MPRA Paper 84501, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economic development; Constitutional design; Critical junctures;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N12 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation

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