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A total eclipse of the heart: compensation strategies in entrepreneurial nonprofits

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  • Ghosh Moulick, Abhisekh
  • Alexiou, Kostas
  • Dowin Kennedy, Elena
  • Parris, Denise Linda

Abstract

We examine how shifting resource dependencies influence compensation strategy during commercial transitions within entrepreneurial nonprofits. Analyzing a longitudinal sample of 4732 organizations, we show how compensation strategies shift non-linearly as nonprofits transition from contributed resource dependence to market-based resource dependence. Dynamic quadratic models unveil a dual threshold of commercialization concerning this transition. Nonprofits at moderate stages of commercialization contend with competing dependencies from both contributed and market-based sources, resulting in a decrease in compensation spending and an increase in part-time employment. At higher stages, contributed resource dependence is eclipsed by market-based dependence, reflected in increasing compensation spending and full-time employment.

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  • Ghosh Moulick, Abhisekh & Alexiou, Kostas & Dowin Kennedy, Elena & Parris, Denise Linda, 2020. "A total eclipse of the heart: compensation strategies in entrepreneurial nonprofits," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 35(4).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbvent:v:35:y:2020:i:4:s0883902618305081
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusvent.2019.105950
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    1. Lucas, David S. & Park, U. David, 2023. "The nature and origins of social venture mission: An exploratory study of political ideology and moral foundations," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 38(2).

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