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The impact of pay on CEO turnover: A test of two perspectives

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  • Shen, Wei
  • Gentry, Richard J.
  • Tosi Jr., Henry L.

Abstract

We investigate the impact of pay on CEO turnover from two perspectives. One is managerial power perspective that focuses on power in the setting of CEO pay. The other is tournament theory that treats CEO pay as a top prize designed to motivate executives to work hard for the top position. Building on research that highlights the impact of power dynamics at the top of the firm on CEO turnover, we propose that managerial power perspective suggests a negative impact of CEO pay on CEO turnover, while tournament theory suggests a positive impact. Using data from a sample of 313 large U.S. companies from 1988 to 1997, we find that both the level of CEO pay and its ratio over the average pay of the firm's four other highest paid executives have a negative impact on CEO turnover.

Suggested Citation

  • Shen, Wei & Gentry, Richard J. & Tosi Jr., Henry L., 2010. "The impact of pay on CEO turnover: A test of two perspectives," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 63(7), pages 729-734, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:63:y:2010:i:7:p:729-734
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    8. Chenli Yin & Dan Li & Maria Paz Salmador, 2022. "Institutional change of compensation policy and its impact on CEO turnover and firm performance," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 16(8), pages 2527-2552, November.
    9. Park, Jong-Hun & Kim, Changsu & Sung, Yun-Dal, 2014. "Whom to dismiss? CEO celebrity and management dismissal," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(11), pages 2346-2355.
    10. Humphreys, Brad & Paul, Rodney & Weinbach, Andrew, 2011. "CEO Turnover: More Evidence on the Role of Performance Expectations," Working Papers 2011-14, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    11. Viet Le & Ann-Ngoc Nguyen & Andros Gregoriou & William Forbes, 2024. "Insider Trading and CEO Pay-Gap Induced Turnover," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 17(11), pages 1-25, October.
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