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Governance structures in the hotel industry

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  • Dahlstrom, Robert
  • Haugland, Sven A.
  • Nygaard, Arne
  • Rokkan, Aksel I.

Abstract

This study investigates alternative governance forms in the hotel industry. Agency theory maintains that the need for control over service quality, financial risk, and the market environment affect the choice of governance form. Prior agency research emphasizes alternative governance structures that principals employ, given local market conditions, agent incentives, and risk preferences. The study augments the established principal-agent perspective with a discussion of entrepreneurial motivations to join hotel alliances. The study analyzes the choice between independent ownership and affiliation with a voluntary chain as well as the choice between integration and franchising. Data analyses from 650 hotels indicate that the hotel size, amenities, population, and distance to headquarters influence governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Dahlstrom, Robert & Haugland, Sven A. & Nygaard, Arne & Rokkan, Aksel I., 2009. "Governance structures in the hotel industry," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 62(8), pages 841-847, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbrese:v:62:y:2009:i:8:p:841-847
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    Cited by:

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    2. Paswan, Audhesh K. & Hirunyawipada, Tanawat & Iyer, Pramod, 2017. "Opportunism, governance structure and relational norms: An interactive perspective," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 131-139.
    3. Shih‐Chuan Lin & Yoo Ri Kim, 2021. "Heterogeneous effects of hotel ownership structure changes on localized market competition using multilevel mixed‐effect analyses," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(4), pages 808-820, June.
    4. Vicente Safón & Alejandro Escribá-Esteve, 2011. "Antecedents and consequences of external risk perception in franchising: evidence from the hospitality industry," Service Business, Springer;Pan-Pacific Business Association, vol. 5(3), pages 237-257, September.
    5. Päivi Karhunen & Svetlana Ledyaeva, 2021. "Is Chain Affiliation a Strategic Asset or Constraint in Emerging Economies? Competitive Strategies and Performance in the Russian Hotel Industry," Management International Review, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 403-427, June.
    6. Fang Deng & Chunbo Zhou, 2022. "Sustainable Development of Corporate Governance in the Hospitality and Tourism Industry: The Evolution and the Future," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(7), pages 1-19, April.
    7. Bénet, Nathalie & Deville, Aude & Raïes, Karine & Valette-Florence, Pierre, 2022. "Turning non-financial performance measurements into financial performance: The usefulness of front-office staff incentive systems in hotels," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 317-327.
    8. Muriel Fadairo & Cintya Lanchimba, 2012. "Performance in distribution systems : What is the influence of the upstream firm's organizational choices ?," Working Papers halshs-00727382, HAL.
    9. Jakob Utgård, 2018. "Retail Chains’ Corporate Social Responsibility Communication," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 147(2), pages 385-400, January.
    10. Peters, Frank, 2018. "The business of video games is a multi-player game : Essays on governance choices and performance in a two-sided market in the cultural industries," Other publications TiSEM 886b3148-4bbb-4ea4-b666-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    11. Muriel Fadairo & Cintya Lanchimba Lopez, 2012. "Performance in distribution systems : What is the influence of the upstream firm’s organizational choices ?," Working Papers 1224, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    12. Yang, Yang & Mao, Zhenxing (Eddie), 2017. "Do independent hotels benefit from the presence of branded ones?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 108-117.
    13. Tran, Phuong Nguyen Thu & Gorton, Matthew & Lemke, Fred, 2021. "When supplier development initiatives fail: Identifying the causes of opportunism and unexpected outcomes," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 277-289.
    14. Guo, Shiau-Ling, 2023. "The governance implication of the geographic concentration of franchise activities for franchise relationships," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).

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