The emergence of private ownership in China
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Cited by:
- Mico APOSTOLOV, 2016. "Ownership And Control Structures A Case Study," Management Research and Practice, Research Centre in Public Administration and Public Services, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 8(2), pages 23-37, June.
- Cheng, Peng & Wei, Jiuchang & Liu, Yang, 2024. "Give a plum in return for a peach: The effect of entrepreneurial informal financing on environmental corporate social responsibility," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).
- Firth, Michael & Fung, Peter M.Y. & Rui, Oliver M., 2007. "How ownership and corporate governance influence chief executive pay in China's listed firms," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 60(7), pages 776-785, July.
- HE Canfei, 2006. "Regional Decentralisation and Location of Foreign Direct Investment in China," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(1), pages 33-50.
- Huang, Wei & Wright, Brian, 2015. "Analyst earnings forecast under complex corporate ownership in China," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 69-84.
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