Borrower distress and the efficiency of relationship banking

We propose that relationship bankers are able to benefit their clients even after they indicate distress. Relationship bankers continually learn about their clients to reduce the asymmetric information problem, reduce adverse selection risk and manage loan risk. We examine the consequences of corporate disclosure, namely profit warnings, as a negative information-releasing event during the normal course of business and evaluate the evolving nature of relationship banking before and after such an event. We show that lenders generally increase the cost of loans, loan security and reduce loan maturity after profit warnings. The average loan spread increases by 17–37 basis points holding all else constant. However, borrowing from relationship lenders lowers the loan spread by 17 basis points compared to borrowing from non-relationship lenders, implying that relationship lenders are able to benefit borrowers. Moreover, borrowers often choose to remain with their relationship bankers due to more favorable loan terms and the high costs of switching lenders. Ultimately, these borrowers end up reducing their default risk and improving their profitability after the profit warning. Our results remain robust even when we control for firms that did not issue profit warnings. We conclude that relationship bankers efficiently use client information to provide effective financial intermediation, even after distress.