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Profiting from connections: Do politicians receive stock tips from brokerage houses?

Author

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  • Stephan, Andrew P.
  • Walther, Beverly R.
  • Wellman, Laura A.

Abstract

This study investigates whether brokerage houses appear to provide stock tips to politicians. Our results indicate that trades by politicians who are politically connected to the brokerage house where the trade is executed are more profitable. Our estimates suggest that these connected trades earn an incremental 0.3% over a five-day window relative to the politician's average profitability. Given the average number of trades our sample politicians execute in a year, the 0.3% return per trade translates to an incremental $3,411 in trading profits each year. We provide additional support by investigating the frequency and differential profitability of politicians' trades immediately before the brokerage house issues a revised recommendation, as well as during a period when Goldman, Sachs & Co. was sanctioned for providing stock tips to high priority clients. Additional tests suggest that brokerages may provide stock tips to politicians in exchange for favorable legislative outcomes or political information.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephan, Andrew P. & Walther, Beverly R. & Wellman, Laura A., 2021. "Profiting from connections: Do politicians receive stock tips from brokerage houses?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:72:y:2021:i:1:s0165410121000161
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2021.101401
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Congressional trading; Political connections; Information exchange; Security analysts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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