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Discussion of “The revolving door and the SEC׳s enforcement outcomes: Initial evidence from civil litigation” by DeHaan, Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal (2015)

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  • Hayes, Rachel M.

Abstract

The study by deHaan et al. (2015) provides an empirical analysis of the effects of revolving door incentives at the SEC. Using a sample of SEC lawyers prosecuting civil cases of accounting misrepresentation, the authors examine how three measures of enforcement outcomes are related to the lawyers׳ career paths. I discuss specific elements of the study׳s research design, including the measurement of the study׳s two key elements, revolving door incentives and regulatory oversight, and comment on the paper׳s findings. While the study is interesting and creative, I believe that its limitations are too great to allow for meaningful conclusions.

Suggested Citation

  • Hayes, Rachel M., 2015. "Discussion of “The revolving door and the SEC׳s enforcement outcomes: Initial evidence from civil litigation” by DeHaan, Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal (2015)," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 1-7.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:60:y:2015:i:2:p:1-7
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.07.007
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    1. deHaan, Ed & Kedia, Simi & Koh, Kevin & Rajgopal, Shivaram, 2015. "The revolving door and the SEC’s enforcement outcomes: Initial evidence from civil litigation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 65-96.
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