IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/irlaec/v63y2020ics0144818820301289.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Reputational cost of securities fraud in japan under a public-enforcement-centered sanction regime

Author

Listed:
  • Zhu, Qiaochu (Amy)

Abstract

In American legal discourse, many commentators believe that the best way to deter securities fraud is the class action, despite its serious side effect: frivolous litigation. A comparative study of securities fraud in Japan, which had an identical securities code addressing securities fraud with the U.S. before the adoption of class action, however, presents a different story.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhu, Qiaochu (Amy), 2020. "Reputational cost of securities fraud in japan under a public-enforcement-centered sanction regime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:63:y:2020:i:c:s0144818820301289
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2020.105915
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818820301289
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.irle.2020.105915?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Agrawal, Anup & Jaffe, Jeffrey F & Karpoff, Jonathan M, 1999. "Management Turnover and Governance Changes following the Revelation of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 309-342, April.
    2. Karpoff, Jonathan M & Lott, John R, Jr & Wehrly, Eric W, 2005. "The Reputational Penalties for Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 653-675, October.
    3. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    4. Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bashir Ahmad & Maria Ciupac-Ulici & Daniela-Georgeta Beju, 2021. "Economic and Non-Economic Variables Affecting Fraud in European Countries," Risks, MDPI, vol. 9(6), pages 1-17, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dan Amiram & Zahn Bozanic & James D. Cox & Quentin Dupont & Jonathan M. Karpoff & Richard Sloan, 2018. "Financial reporting fraud and other forms of misconduct: a multidisciplinary review of the literature," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 732-783, June.
    2. Cline, Brandon N. & Walkling, Ralph A. & Yore, Adam S., 2018. "The consequences of managerial indiscretions: Sex, lies, and firm value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(2), pages 389-415.
    3. Chao Fu & Xiuyuan Deng & Hongfei Tang, 2023. "Who cares about corporate fraud? Evidence from cross-border mergers and acquisitions of Chinese companies," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 747-789, February.
    4. Alexander, Cindy R, 1999. "On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 489-526, April.
    5. Md Mosharraf Hossain & Lafang Wang & Jing Yu, 2024. "The reputational costs of corporate environmental underperformance: evidence from China," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 930-948, February.
    6. Armour, John & Mayer, Colin & Polo, Andrea, 2017. "Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 1429-1448, August.
    7. Quentin Dupont & Jonathan M. Karpoff, 2020. "The Trust Triangle: Laws, Reputation, and Culture in Empirical Finance Research," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 163(2), pages 217-238, May.
    8. Peter-Jan Engelen, 2011. "Legal versus Reputational Penalties in Deterring Corporate Misconduct," Chapters, in: Mehmet Ugur & David Sunderland (ed.), Does Economic Governance Matter?, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Franco Mariuzzo & Peter Ormosi & Zherou Majied, 2019. "Public and reputational sanctions: The case of cartels," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2018-06v3, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    10. Liu, Chelsea & Aharony, Joseph & Richardson, Grant & Yawson, Alfred, 2016. "Corporate litigation and changes in CEO reputation: Guidance from U.S. Federal Court lawsuits," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 15-34.
    11. Mariuzzo, Franco & Ormosi, Peter L & Majied, Zherou, 2020. "Fines and reputational sanctions: The case of cartels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    12. Minzyuk, Larysa, 2010. "The development of non-monetary means of payment," MPRA Paper 28167, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2010.
    13. Luisa Menapace & GianCarlo Moschini, 2012. "Quality certification by geographical indications, trademarks and firm reputation," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press and the European Agricultural and Applied Economics Publications Foundation, vol. 39(4), pages 539-566, September.
    14. Michelle Haynes & Steve Thompson, 2012. "The Economic Significance of User-Generated Feedback," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(1), pages 153-166, February.
    15. Steenkamp, J-B.E.M. & Nijs, V.R. & Hanssens, D.M. & Dekimpe, M.G., 2002. "Competitive Reactions and the Cross-Sales Effects of Advertising and Promotion," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2002-20-MKT, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    16. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017. "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 816-852.
    17. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1992. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 566-578, June.
    18. Khurshed, Arif & Kostas, Dimitris & Mohamed, Abdulkadir & Saadouni, Brahim, 2018. "Initial public offerings on the UK when-issued market," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 1-14.
    19. Eric Rasmusen, 2008. "Quality-Ensuring Profits," Working Papers 2008-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    20. Martin Gaynor, "undated". "What Do We Know About Competition and Quality in Health Care Markets?," GSIA Working Papers 2006-E62, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:63:y:2020:i:c:s0144818820301289. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.