IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/irlaec/v42y2015icp1-12.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A nexus of contracts theory of legal entities

Author

Listed:
  • Ayotte, Kenneth
  • Hansmann, Henry

Abstract

In this paper, we develop a theory that explains why firms are so commonly organized as legal entities that are formally distinct from their owners. A legal entity permits an owner to create a firm as a bundle of contracts that can be transferred to someone else, but only if they are transferred together. This bundled assignability allows for a balancing of several potentially conflicting interests. First, the owner who assembles the contracts wants liquidity – that is, the ability to transfer the contracts and cash out. Second, the firm's contractual counterparties want protection from opportunistic transfers that will reduce the value of the performance they have been promised. And third, the owner wants long-term commitments from the firm's counterparties to protect the value of her investments in the bundle. Because transfers of equity interests in a legal entity will generally not be considered assignments of the entity's contracts, entities reduce the contracting costs of creating bundled assignability. We find that owners will prefer bundled assignability when investments in the bundle are alienable from the owner; but when investments are specific to the owner, contracts that prohibit changes of control are optimal.

Suggested Citation

  • Ayotte, Kenneth & Hansmann, Henry, 2015. "A nexus of contracts theory of legal entities," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1-12.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:42:y:2015:i:c:p:1-12
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2014.10.001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818814000672
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.irle.2014.10.001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    4. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    5. Hansmann, Henry & Kraakman, Reinier, 2000. "Organizational law as asset partitioning," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 807-817, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Massimo Florio & Simona Gamba, 2021. "Biomed Europa: After the coronavirus, a public infrastructure to overcome the pharmaceutical oligopoly," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 92(3), pages 387-409, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Matthias Kiefer & Edward Jones & Andrew Adams, 2016. "Principals, Agents and Incomplete Contracts: Are Surrender of Control and Renegotiation the Solution?," CFI Discussion Papers 1603, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University.
    2. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "The Governance of the New Enterprise," CRSP working papers 487, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    3. Kenneth Ayotte & Patrick Bolton, 2011. "Optimal Property Rights in Financial Contracting," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(10), pages 3401-3433.
    4. Eitan Goldman & Gary Gorton, 2000. "The Visible Hand, the Invisible Hand and Efficiency," NBER Working Papers 7587, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Gérard Charreaux, 2002. "Variation sur le thème:"À la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise"," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 5(3), pages 5-68, September.
    6. Matyukha, Andriy, 2017. "Business groups in agriculture impact of ownership structures on performance: The case of Russia's agroholdings," Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Transition Economies 254051, Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO).
    7. Crama, Y. & Leruth, L. & Renneboog, L.D.R. & Urbain, J-P., 1999. "Corporate Governance Structures, Control and Performance in European Markets : A Tale of Two Systems," Discussion Paper 1999-97, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    8. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001. "The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(3), pages 805-851.
    9. Filippi, Maryline & Chapdaniel, Alain, 2020. "Sustainable demand-supply chain: an innovative approach for improving sustainability in agrifood chains," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 24(2), March.
    10. Deffains, Bruno & Demougin, Dominique M., 2006. "Governance: Who controls matters," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2006-053, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    11. Dietrich, Diemo & Jindra, Björn, 2010. "Corporate governance in the multinational enterprise: A financial contracting perspective," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 446-456, October.
    12. Luigi Zingales, 2000. "In Search of New Foundations," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(4), pages 1623-1653, August.
    13. Yildiz, Özgür, 2016. "Public-private partnerships, incomplete contracts, and distributional fairness – when payments matter," MPRA Paper 74552, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. J. (Hans) van Oosterhout, 2007. "Authority and Democracy in Corporate Governance?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 71(4), pages 359-370, April.
    15. Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2012. "Hold-up and externality: the firm as a nexus of incomplete rights?," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(2), pages 157-174, July.
    16. Christos Pitelis, 2013. "Towards a More ‘Ethically Correct’ Governance for Economic Sustainability," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 118(3), pages 655-665, December.
    17. Margaret M. Blair, 2005. "Institutionalists, Neoclassicals and Team Production," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 43(4), pages 605-616, December.
    18. Tobias Hiller, 2021. "Hierarchy and the size of a firm," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 68(3), pages 389-404, September.
    19. Dilger, Alexander & Frick, Bernd & Speckbacher, Gerhard, 1999. "Mitbestimmung als zentrale Frage der Corporate Governance," Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Diskussionspapiere 02/1999, University of Greifswald, Faculty of Law and Economics.
    20. Allen Kaufman & Ernie Englander, 2011. "Behavioral Economics, Federalism, and the Triumph of Stakeholder Theory," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 102(3), pages 421-438, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:42:y:2015:i:c:p:1-12. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/irle .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.