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Evidence of marginal deterrence: Kidnapping and murder in Italy

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  • Detotto, Claudio
  • McCannon, Bryan C.
  • Vannini, Marco

Abstract

Empirical evidence of the marginal deterrent effect is provided. Exploring a data set of kidnapping crimes in Italy between 1960 and 2012, changes in Italian policy regarding sanctions for kidnapping and their associated impact on murders is considered. Deaths associated with kidnappings increase in prevalence when the kidnapping sanction increased, causing a decrease in the marginal sanction for murder. Death rates reversed when enhanced sanctions for murder were later introduced.

Suggested Citation

  • Detotto, Claudio & McCannon, Bryan C. & Vannini, Marco, 2015. "Evidence of marginal deterrence: Kidnapping and murder in Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 63-67.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:41:y:2015:i:c:p:63-67
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2014.11.001
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    1. Detotto Claudio & McCannon Bryan C. & Vannini Marco, 2014. "Understanding Ransom Kidnappings and Their Duration," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 14(3), pages 849-871, July.
    2. Porreca, Zachary, 2024. "Bride Kidnapping and Informal Governance Institutions," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1391, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    3. Shaun Larcom & Mare Sarr, 2018. "On the Perils of Commitment to Punishment when Criminals Are Strategic," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 391-418.
    4. Satadru Das & Naci Mocan, 2020. "Analyzing The Impact Of The World'S Largest Public Works Project On Crime," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(3), pages 1167-1182, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Crime; Italy; Kidnapping; Marginal deterrence; Murder;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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