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A model of punitive damages in tort

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  • Biggar, Darryl

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  • Biggar, Darryl, 1995. "A model of punitive damages in tort," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-24, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:15:y:1995:i:1:p:1-24
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. William P. Rogerson, 1984. "Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 39-53, Spring.
    2. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    3. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 562-570, Winter.
    4. Landes, William M. & Posner, Richard A., 1981. "An economic theory of intentional torts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 127-154, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Accident Law," NBER Working Papers 9483, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Dnes, Antony W. & Seaton, Jonathan S., 1997. "An exploration of the tort criminal boundary using manslaughter and negligence cases," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 537-551, December.
    3. Thomas J. Miceli & Michael P. Stone, 2013. "The Determinants Of State-Level Caps On Punitive Damages: Theory And Evidence," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(1), pages 110-125, January.
    4. Chu, C.Y. Cyrus & Huang, Chen-Ying, 2004. "On the definition and efficiency of punitive damages," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 241-254, June.

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