IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/inecon/v70y2006i2p470-489.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Devaluation without common knowledge

Author

Listed:
  • Rochon, Celine

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Rochon, Celine, 2006. "Devaluation without common knowledge," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 470-489, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:70:y:2006:i:2:p:470-489
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022-1996(06)00021-3
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Broner, Fernando A., 2008. "Discrete devaluations and multiple equilibria in a first generation model of currency crises," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 592-605, April.
    2. Cooper,Russell, 1999. "Coordination Games," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521578967.
    3. Dilip Abreu & Markus K. Brunnermeier, 2003. "Bubbles and Crashes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 173-204, January.
    4. Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2006. "Dynamics of currency crises with asset market frictions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 141-158, January.
    5. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-1028, July.
    6. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 1037-1047, April.
    7. Christina E. Bannier & Frank Heinemann, 2005. "Optimal Transparency and Risk-Taking to Avoid Currency Crises," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 161(3), pages 374-391, September.
    8. Guesnerie, Roger, 1992. "An Exploration of the Eductive Justifications of the Rational-Expectations Hypothesis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1254-1278, December.
    9. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 311-325, August.
    10. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
    11. Flood, Robert P. & Garber, Peter M. & Kramer, Charles, 1996. "Collapsing exchange rate regimes: Another linear example," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-4), pages 223-234, November.
    12. Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song, 1998. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 587-597, June.
    13. Botman, Dennis P. J. & Jager, Henk, 2002. "Coordination of speculation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 159-175, October.
    14. Jeanne, Olivier & Masson, Paul, 2000. "Currency crises, sunspots and Markov-switching regimes," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 327-350, April.
    15. Flood, Robert P. & Garber, Peter M., 1984. "Collapsing exchange-rate regimes : Some linear examples," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1-2), pages 1-13, August.
    16. David Frankel & Ady Pauzner, 2000. "Resolving Indeterminacy in Dynamic Settings: The Role of Shocks," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(1), pages 285-304.
    17. Christophe Chamley, 2003. "Dynamic Speculative Attacks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 603-621, June.
    18. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-1050, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Broner, Fernando A., 2008. "Discrete devaluations and multiple equilibria in a first generation model of currency crises," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 592-605, April.
    2. Feltenstein, Andrew & Rochon, Céline, 2009. "Can good events lead to bad outcomes? Endogenous banking crises and fiscal policy responses," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 396-409, September.
    3. Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel, 2009. "Speculative attacks: A laboratory study in continuous time," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 1064-1082, October.
    4. Gara Minguez-Afonso, 2007. "Imperfect Common Knowledge in First-Generation Models of Currency Crises," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 81-112, March.
    5. Piersanti, Giovanni, 2012. "The Macroeconomic Theory of Exchange Rate Crises," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199653126.
    6. Mei Li & Frank Milne, 2007. "The Role Of Large Players In A Dynamic Currency Attack Game," Working Paper 1148, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    7. Li, Mei & Milne, Frank, 2014. "The role of a large trader in a dynamic currency attack model," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 590-620.
    8. Mei Li & Frank Milne, 2010. "A Large Trader in Bubbles and Crashes: an Application to Currency Attacks," Working Papers 1004, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Tijmen R. Daniels & Henk Jager & Franc Klaassen, 2008. "Defending against Speculative Attacks," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-090/2, Tinbergen Institute, revised 06 Apr 2009.
    2. Piersanti, Giovanni, 2012. "The Macroeconomic Theory of Exchange Rate Crises," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199653126.
    3. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2009-011 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Daniëls, Tijmen R. & Jager, Henk & Klaassen, Franc, 2011. "Currency crises with the threat of an interest rate defence," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 14-24, September.
    5. Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel, 2009. "Speculative attacks: A laboratory study in continuous time," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(6), pages 1064-1082, October.
    6. Broner, Fernando A., 2008. "Discrete devaluations and multiple equilibria in a first generation model of currency crises," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 592-605, April.
    7. Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2007. "Currency Crisis Triggers: Sunspots or Thresholds?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6487, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2008. "Vulnerability of currency pegs: evidence from Brazil," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4909, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    9. Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2006. "Dynamics of currency crises with asset market frictions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 141-158, January.
    10. George-Marios Angeletos & Christian Hellwig & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(3), pages 711-756, May.
    11. Junichi Fujimoto, 2014. "Speculative attacks with multiple targets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(1), pages 89-132, September.
    12. Angeletos, G.-M. & Lian, C., 2016. "Incomplete Information in Macroeconomics," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1065-1240, Elsevier.
    13. Guimaraes, Bernardo & Morris, Stephen, 2007. "Risk and wealth in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2205-2230, November.
    14. Giancarlo Marini & Giovanni Piersanti, 2012. "Models of Speculative Attacks and Crashes in International Capital Markets," CEIS Research Paper 245, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 24 Jul 2012.
    15. Guimaraes, Bernardo, 2005. "Unique equilibrium in a dynamic model of crises with frictions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4907, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    16. Guimaraes, Bernardo & Morris, Stephen, 2007. "Risk and wealth in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2205-2230, November.
    17. Tijmen Daniëls, 2009. "Unique Equilibrium in a Dynamic Model of Speculative Attacks," De Economist, Springer, vol. 157(4), pages 417-439, December.
    18. Bauer, Christian & Ernstberger, Philip, 2014. "The Dynamics of Currency Crises - Results from Intertemporal Optimization and Viscosity Solutions," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100300, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    19. Feltenstein, Andrew & Rochon, Céline, 2009. "Can good events lead to bad outcomes? Endogenous banking crises and fiscal policy responses," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 396-409, September.
    20. Roger Guesnerie & Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2011. "Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(2), pages 205-246, June.
    21. Arias, Guillaume & Erlandsson, Ulf, 2004. "Regime switching as an alternative early warning system of currency crises - an application to South-East Asia," Working Papers 2004:11, Lund University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:70:y:2006:i:2:p:470-489. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.