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Analytics of sovereign debt restructuring

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  • Haldane, Andrew G.
  • Penalver, Adrian
  • Saporta, Victoria
  • Shin, Hyun Song

Abstract

Over the past few years there has been an active debate among policy-makers on appropriate mechanisms for restructuring sovereign debt, particularly international bonds. In this paper a simple theoretical model is developed to analyse the merits of these proposals. The analysis suggests that collective action clauses (CACs) can resolve the inefficiencies caused by intra-creditor coordination problems, provided that all parties have complete information about each others preferences. In such a world, statutory mechanisms are unnecessary. This is no longer the case, however, when the benefits from reaching a restructuring agreement are private information to the debtor and its creditors. In this case, the inefficiencies induced by strategic behaviour the debtor-creditor bargaining problem cannot be resolved by the parties themselves: removing these inefficiencies would require the intervention of a third party.
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Suggested Citation

  • Haldane, Andrew G. & Penalver, Adrian & Saporta, Victoria & Shin, Hyun Song, 2005. "Analytics of sovereign debt restructuring," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 315-333, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:65:y:2005:i:2:p:315-333
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    References listed on IDEAS

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