Tariff policy for a monopolist in a signaling game
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Cited by:
- Santiago J. Rubio & María Dolores Alepuz, 2005. "Foreign Monopolies And Tariff Agreements Under Integrated Markets," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-38, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Aditya Bhattacharjea, 2002. "Infant Industry Protection Revisited," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(3), pages 115-133.
- Furusawa, Taiji & Higashida, Keisaku & Ishikawa, Jota, 2003. "What information is needed for welfare-enhancing policies under international oligopoly?," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 31-46, January.
- Beladi, Hamid & Chakrabarti, Avik, 2008. "Foreign equity participation under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 279-295, July.
- McCalman, Phillip, 2010. "Trade policy in a "super size me" world," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 206-218, July.
- Bouët, Antoine & Cassagnard, Patrice, 2013. "Strategic trade policy under asymmetric information with screening," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 286-293.
- Takaaki Hamada, 2023. "Endogenous timing in tax competition: The effect of asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(3), pages 570-614, June.
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