Strategic trade policy under asymmetric information with screening
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2013.02.024
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Biancini, Sara, 2018.
"Regulating national firms in a common market under asymmetric information,"
Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 450-460.
- Sara Biancini, 2018. "Regulating national firms in a common market under asymmetric information," Post-Print halshs-01615102, HAL.
- Countryman, Amanda M. & Narayanan, Badri G., 2017.
"Price volatility, tariff structure and the special safeguard mechanism,"
Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 399-408.
- Leister, Amanda M. & Narayanan, Badri, 2015. "Price Volatility, Tariff Structure and the Special Safeguard Mechanism," 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28, San Francisco, California 205806, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Berthoumieu, Julien & Bouët, Antoine, 2015. "The impact of “At-the-Border†and “Behind-the-Border†policies on cost-reducing research and development," IFPRI discussion papers 1425, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
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More about this item
Keywords
Cournot duopoly; International trade; Adverse selection; Screening;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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