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On the role of empirical industrial organization in competition policy

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  • Davis, Peter

Abstract

In this paper I consider the role of empirical industrial organization (IO) in competition policy. In particular, I consider the effect of the institutional setting in which competition policy is developed on the diffusion of ideas and techniques emerging from the empirical IO literature. In doing so my aims are two fold. First, I aim to understand the areas of competition policy most likely to provide fertile ground for future work, and those which are less likely to have an impact. And second, I hope to make a small step towards ensuring that the important potential synergies between competition policy and empirical IO are more fully developed -- to the benefit of both communities and, more importantly, the public. This paper necessarily draws heavily on my experience in the UK, but many remarks may resonate more generally.

Suggested Citation

  • Davis, Peter, 2011. "On the role of empirical industrial organization in competition policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 323-328, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:3:p:323-328
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