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Relying on information acquired by a principal

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  • Finkle, Aaron

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  • Finkle, Aaron, 2005. "Relying on information acquired by a principal," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 263-278, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:23:y:2005:i:3-4:p:263-278
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, 1997. "Retail Contracting: Theory and Practice," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 1-25, March.
    2. Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1767-1797, November.
    3. Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Contracts and Productive Information Gathering," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 174-193, November.
    4. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January.
    5. Mezzetti, Claudio & Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 2000. "Gathering information before signing a contract with a privately informed principal," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 667-689, May.
    6. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(1), pages 3-35.
    7. Demski, Js & Sappington, Dem, 1993. "Sourcing With Unverifiable Performance Information," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 1-20.
    8. Barzel,Yoram, 1997. "Economic Analysis of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521597135, February.
    9. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1997. "Information Management in Incentive Problems," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 796-821, August.
    10. Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2004. "Choice of technology in outsourcing: an endogenous information structure," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 165-178, June.
    11. Kahn, Charles M. & Green, Jerry, 1983. "Wage-Employment Contracts," Scholarly Articles 3203642, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    12. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 379-409, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Shin, Dongsoo, 2008. "Information acquisition and optimal project management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 1032-1043, July.
    2. Justin Downs, 2021. "Information gathering by overconfident agents," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 554-568, August.
    3. Lina Vyas & Mark Hayllar & Yan Wu, 2018. "Bridging the Gap - Contractor and Bureaucrat Conceptions of Contract Management in Outsourcing," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 413-439, December.
    4. Roland Strausz, 2009. "Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 845-870, September.
    5. Bedard, Nicholas C., 2017. "The strategically ignorant principal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 548-561.
    6. Leon Yang Chu & David E.M. Sappington, 2009. "Implementing high‐powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 296-316, June.
    7. Dongsoo Shin & S. Andrew Starbird, 2009. "Risk Taking as Self Discipline in Contractual Relationships," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(3), pages 289-304.
    8. Shin, Dongsoo, 2015. "Incentives and management styles," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 22-31.
    9. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2014. "Upfront versus staged financing: the role of verifiability," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(6), pages 1069-1078, June.
    10. Peitz, Martin & Shin, Dongsoo, 2015. "Capital-labor distortions in project finance," Working Papers 15-01, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    11. Bing Ye & Sanxi Li, 2018. "Competitive contracts with productive information gathering," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 1-17, May.
    12. Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2008. "Informed principal and information gathering agent," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 12(4), pages 229-244, December.
    13. Martin Peitz & Dongsoo Shin, 2020. "Distorted Input Ratios in Vertical Relationships," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(4), pages 1480-1509, October.

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