IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ijrema/v34y2017i3p622-640.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Incorporating hidden costs of annoying ads in display auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Stourm, Valeria
  • Bax, Eric

Abstract

Media publisher platforms often face an effectiveness-nuisance tradeoff: more annoying ads can be more effective for some advertisers because of their ability to attract attention, but after attracting viewers' attention, their nuisance to viewers can decrease engagement with the platform over time. With the rise of mobile technology and ad blockers, many platforms are becoming increasingly concerned about how to improve monetization through digital ads while improving viewer experience.

Suggested Citation

  • Stourm, Valeria & Bax, Eric, 2017. "Incorporating hidden costs of annoying ads in display auctions," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 622-640.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ijrema:v:34:y:2017:i:3:p:622-640
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijresmar.2017.02.002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167811617300071
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ijresmar.2017.02.002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth C. Wilbur, 2008. "A Two-Sided, Empirical Model of Television Advertising and Viewing Markets," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 27(3), pages 356-378, 05-06.
    2. Anja Lambrecht & Avi Goldfarb & Alessandro Bonatti & Anindya Ghose & Daniel Goldstein & Randall Lewis & Anita Rao & Navdeep Sahni & Song Yao, 2014. "How do firms make money selling digital goods online?," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 331-341, September.
    3. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    4. L. Elisa Celis & Gregory Lewis & Markus Mobius & Hamid Nazerzadeh, 2014. "Buy-It-Now or Take-a-Chance: Price Discrimination Through Randomized Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(12), pages 2927-2948, December.
    5. Kenneth C. Wilbur & Linli Xu & David Kempe, 2013. "Correcting Audience Externalities in Television Advertising," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(6), pages 892-912, November.
    6. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    7. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hana Choi & Carl F. Mela & Santiago R. Balseiro & Adam Leary, 2020. "Online Display Advertising Markets: A Literature Review and Future Directions," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 31(2), pages 556-575, June.
    2. Vinay Singh & Brijesh Nanavati & Arpan Kumar Kar & Agam Gupta, 2023. "How to Maximize Clicks for Display Advertisement in Digital Marketing? A Reinforcement Learning Approach," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 1621-1638, August.
    3. Singh, Ashutosh & Sajeesh, S. & Bhardwaj, Pradeep, 2024. "Whitelisting versus advertising-recovery: Strategies to overcome advertising blocking by consumers," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 318(1), pages 217-229.
    4. Eric Bax, 2020. "Heavy Tails Make Happy Buyers," Papers 2002.09014, arXiv.org.
    5. Shunyao Yan & Klaus M. Miller & Bernd Skiera, 2020. "How Does the Adoption of Ad Blockers Affect News Consumption?," Papers 2005.06840, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2021.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kenneth C. Wilbur & Linli Xu & David Kempe, 2013. "Correcting Audience Externalities in Television Advertising," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(6), pages 892-912, November.
    2. Tim Roughgarden & Inbal Talgam-Cohen & Qiqi Yan, 2019. "Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 68(4), pages 1074-1094, July.
    3. Lau, Stephanie, 2011. "Investment incentives in bilateral trading," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 538-552.
    4. Tafreshian, Amirmahdi & Masoud, Neda, 2022. "A truthful subsidy scheme for a peer-to-peer ridesharing market with incomplete information," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 130-161.
    5. Shrestha, Ratna K., 2017. "Menus of price-quantity contracts for inducing the truth in environmental regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 1-7.
    6. Tommy Andersson & Lars Ehlers & Lars-Gunnar Svensson & Ryan Tierney, 2022. "Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(4), pages 3110-3128, November.
    7. Mishra, Debasis & Parkes, David C., 2007. "Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 335-366, January.
    8. Loertscher, Simon & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2021. "A dominant strategy, double clock auction with estimation-based tatonnement," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
    9. Mizukami, Hideki & Saijo, Tatsuyoshi & Wakayama, Takuma, 2003. "Strategy-Proof Sharing," Working Papers 1170, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    10. Attila Ambrus & Emilio Calvano & Markus Reisinger, 2016. "Either or Both Competition: A "Two-Sided" Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 189-222, August.
    11. William H. Sandholm, 2005. "Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(3), pages 885-915.
    12. Soumyakanti Chakraborty & Anup K. Sen & Amitava Bagchi, 2015. "Addressing the valuation problem in multi-round combinatorial auctions," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 17(5), pages 1145-1160, October.
    13. Chun, Youngsub & Yengin, Duygu, 2017. "Welfare lower bounds and strategy-proofness in the queueing problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 462-476.
    14. Toyotaka Sakai, 2017. "Considering Collective Choice: The Route 328 Problem in Kodaira City," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 68(3), pages 323-332, September.
    15. David C. Parkes & Jayant Kalagnanam, 2005. "Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 435-451, March.
    16. Dütting, Paul & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Roughgarden, Tim, 2017. "Modularity and greed in double auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 83199, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    17. , & ,, 2015. "Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(2), May.
    18. d'Aspremont, Claude & Cremer, Jacques & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 2004. "Balanced Bayesian mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 385-396, April.
    19. Hiroki Saitoh & Shigehiro Serizawa, 2008. "Vickrey allocation rule with income effect," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(2), pages 391-401, May.
    20. John Duggan & Joanne Roberts, 2002. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1070-1078, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ijrema:v:34:y:2017:i:3:p:622-640. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/international-journal-of-research-in-marketing/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.