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Understanding the physical and economic consequences of attacks on control systems

Author

Listed:
  • Huang, Yu-Lun
  • Cárdenas, Alvaro A.
  • Amin, Saurabh
  • Lin, Zong-Syun
  • Tsai, Hsin-Yi
  • Sastry, Shankar

Abstract

This paper describes an approach for developing threat models for attacks on control systems. These models are useful for analyzing the actions taken by an attacker who gains access to control system assets and for evaluating the effects of the attacker’s actions on the physical process being controlled. The paper proposes models for integrity attacks and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, and evaluates the physical and economic consequences of the attacks on a chemical reactor system. The analysis reveals two important points. First, a DoS attack does not have a significant effect when the reactor is in the steady state; however, combining the DoS attack with a relatively innocuous integrity attack rapidly causes the reactor to move to an unsafe state. Second, an attack that seeks to increase the operational cost of the chemical reactor involves a radically different strategy than an attack on plant safety (i.e., one that seeks to shut down the reactor or cause an explosion).

Suggested Citation

  • Huang, Yu-Lun & Cárdenas, Alvaro A. & Amin, Saurabh & Lin, Zong-Syun & Tsai, Hsin-Yi & Sastry, Shankar, 2009. "Understanding the physical and economic consequences of attacks on control systems," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 73-83.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ijocip:v:2:y:2009:i:3:p:73-83
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijcip.2009.06.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Henriques de Gusmão, Ana Paula & Mendonça Silva, Maisa & Poleto, Thiago & Camara e Silva, Lúcio & Cabral Seixas Costa, Ana Paula, 2018. "Cybersecurity risk analysis model using fault tree analysis and fuzzy decision theory," International Journal of Information Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 248-260.
    2. Wang, Wei & Cammi, Antonio & Di Maio, Francesco & Lorenzi, Stefano & Zio, Enrico, 2018. "A Monte Carlo-based exploration framework for identifying components vulnerable to cyber threats in nuclear power plants," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 24-37.
    3. Singh, Abhishek Narain & Gupta, M.P. & Ojha, Amitabh, 2014. "Identifying critical infrastructure sectors and their dependencies: An Indian scenario," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 71-85.
    4. CHERIFI, Tarek & HAMAMI, Lamia, 2018. "A practical implementation of unconditional security for the IEC 60780-5-101 SCADA protocol," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 68-84.
    5. Yampolskiy, Mark & Horváth, Péter & Koutsoukos, Xenofon D. & Xue, Yuan & Sztipanovits, Janos, 2015. "A language for describing attacks on cyber-physical systems," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 8(C), pages 40-52.
    6. Fu, Yangyang & O'Neill, Zheng & Yang, Zhiyao & Adetola, Veronica & Wen, Jin & Ren, Lingyu & Wagner, Tim & Zhu, Qi & Wu, Terresa, 2021. "Modeling and evaluation of cyber-attacks on grid-interactive efficient buildings," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 303(C).
    7. Sugumar, Gayathri & Mathur, Aditya, 2019. "A method for testing distributed anomaly detectors," International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Elsevier, vol. 27(C).

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