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Incentivizing appropriate prescribing in primary care: Development and first results of an electronic health record-based pay-for-performance scheme

Author

Listed:
  • Ramerman, Lotte
  • Hek, Karin
  • Cramer- van der Welle, Christine
  • Simons-Winters, Ellis
  • Middelweerd, Anouk
  • Lambooij, Anke
  • Verheij, Robert

Abstract

Part of the funding of Dutch General Practitioners (GPs) care is based on pay-for-performance, including an incentive for appropriate prescribing according to guidelines in national formularies. Aim of this paper is to describe the development of an indicator and an infrastructure based on prescription data from GP Electronic Health Records (EHR), to assess the level of adherence to formularies and the effects of the pay-for-performance scheme, thereby assessing the usefulness of the infrastructure and the indicator.

Suggested Citation

  • Ramerman, Lotte & Hek, Karin & Cramer- van der Welle, Christine & Simons-Winters, Ellis & Middelweerd, Anouk & Lambooij, Anke & Verheij, Robert, 2022. "Incentivizing appropriate prescribing in primary care: Development and first results of an electronic health record-based pay-for-performance scheme," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 126(10), pages 1010-1017.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:126:y:2022:i:10:p:1010-1017
    DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2022.07.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lina Maria Ellegård & Jens Dietrichson & Anders Anell, 2018. "Can pay‐for‐performance to primary care providers stimulate appropriate use of antibiotics?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(1), pages 39-54, January.
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    3. F. P. Vlaanderen & M. A. Tanke & B. R. Bloem & M. J. Faber & F. Eijkenaar & F. T. Schut & P. P. T. Jeurissen, 2019. "Design and effects of outcome-based payment models in healthcare: a systematic review," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 20(2), pages 217-232, March.
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