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Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample

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  • Wichardt, Philipp C.

Abstract

This paper provides an example showing that for finite extensive form games without perfect recall existence of Nash equilibria in behaviour strategies is not guaranteed in general.

Suggested Citation

  • Wichardt, Philipp C., 2008. "Existence of Nash equilibria in finite extensive form games with imperfect recall: A counterexample," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 366-369, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:63:y:2008:i:1:p:366-369
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 3-24, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Burkhard Schipper, 2017. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Games with Unawareness," Working Papers 176, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    2. Burkhard Schipper, 2017. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Games with Unawareness," Working Papers 204, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    3. Lambert, Nicolas S. & Marple, Adrian & Shoham, Yoav, 2019. "On equilibria in games with imperfect recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 164-185.
    4. Wichardt, Philipp C., 2012. "Existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 709-713.
    5. Wichardt, Philipp C., 2010. "Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 472-487, November.
    6. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2017. "Characterizations of perfect recall," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(2), pages 311-326, May.
    7. Francesco Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni, 2018. "A concept of sincerity for combinatorial voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(3), pages 493-512, October.

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