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Counting combinatorial choice rules

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  • Echenique, Federico

Abstract

I count the number of combinatorial choice rules that satisfy certain properties: Kelso-Crawford substitutability, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The results are important for two-sided matching theory, where agents are modeled by combinatorial choice rules with these properties. The rules are a small, and asymptotically vanishing, fraction of all choice rules. But they are still exponentially more than the preference relations over individual agents- --which has positive implications for the Gale-Shapley algorithm of matching theory.
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  • Echenique, Federico, 2007. "Counting combinatorial choice rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 231-245, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:58:y:2007:i:2:p:231-245
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Samson Alva & Battal Dou{g}an, 2021. "Choice and Market Design," Papers 2110.15446, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
    2. Koji Yokote & Isa E. Hafalir & Fuhito Kojima & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2023. "Rationalizing Path-Independent Choice Rules," Papers 2303.00892, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
    3. Battal Dou{g}an & Kenzo Imamura & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2022. "Market Design with Deferred Acceptance: A Recipe for Policymaking," Papers 2209.06777, arXiv.org.
    4. Echenique, Federico & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2007. "A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 46-71, April.
    5. Mehmet Ekmekci & M. Bumin Yenmez, "undated". "Integrating Schools for Centralized Admissions," GSIA Working Papers 2014-E20, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    6. M. Bumin Yenmez, 2014. "College Admissions," GSIA Working Papers 2014-E24, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    7. Tam'as Fleiner & Zsuzsanna Jank'o & Ildik'o Schlotter & Alexander Teytelboym, 2018. "Complexity of Stability in Trading Networks," Papers 1805.08758, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2019.
    8. Segal, Ilya, 2007. "The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 341-378, September.
    9. Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2018. "A college admissions clearinghouse," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 859-885.
    10. Doğan, Battal & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2019. "Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 366-373.
    11. Hans Peters & Panos Protopapas, 2021. "Set and revealed preference axioms for multi-valued choice," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 90(1), pages 11-29, February.
    12. Hideo Konishi & M. Utku Ünver, 2003. "Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems," Working Papers 2003.115, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    13. Tam'as Fleiner & Zsuzsanna Jank'o & Akihisa Tamura & Alexander Teytelboym, 2015. "Trading Networks with Bilateral Contracts," Papers 1510.01210, arXiv.org, revised May 2018.
    14. Erdil, Aytek & Kumano, Taro, 2019. "Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    15. Ilya Segal, 2004. "The Communication Requirements of of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets," Economics Working Papers 0039, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    16. Alva, Samson, 2018. "WARP and combinatorial choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 320-333.
    17. Stefano Vannucci, 2011. "Widwast Choice," Department of Economics University of Siena 629, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    18. Tamás Fleiner & Zsuzsanna Jankó & Ildikó Schlotter & Alexander Teytelboym, 2023. "Complexity of stability in trading networks," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 629-648, September.
    19. Juan F. Fung & Chia-Ling Hsu, 2021. "A cumulative offer process for supply chain networks," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(1), pages 93-109, June.
    20. Orhan Aygün & Tayfun Sönmez, 2012. "The Importance of Irrelevance of Rejected Contracts in Matching under Weakened Substitutes Conditions," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 805, Boston College Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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