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Coordination, "Magic," and Reinforcement Learning in a Market Entry Game

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  • Erev, Ido
  • Rapoport, Amnon

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  • Erev, Ido & Rapoport, Amnon, 1998. "Coordination, "Magic," and Reinforcement Learning in a Market Entry Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 146-175, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:23:y:1998:i:2:p:146-175
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-1095, December.
    2. Stahl Dale O. & Wilson Paul W., 1995. "On Players' Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 218-254, July.
    3. Jack Ochs, 1990. "The Coordination Problem in Decentralized Markets: An Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(2), pages 545-559.
    4. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-248, March.
    5. Sundali, James A. & Rapoport, Amnon & Seale, Darryl A., 1995. "Coordination in Market Entry Games with Symmetric Players," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 203-218, November.
    6. Gary-Bobo, Robert J., 1990. "On the existence of equilibrium points in a class of asymmetric market entry games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 239-246, September.
    7. Mookherjee, Dilip & Sopher, Barry, 1997. "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 97-132, April.
    8. Vesna Prasnikar & Alvin E. Roth, 1992. "Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(3), pages 865-888.
    9. Bolton, Gary E, 1991. "A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1096-1136, December.
    10. Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
    11. Harrison, Glenn W & McCabe, Kevin A, 1996. "Expectations and Fairness in a Simple Bargaining Experiment," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(3), pages 303-327.
    12. David J. Cooper & Susan Garvin & John H. Kagel, 1997. "Signalling and Adaptive Learning in an Entry Limit Pricing Game," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(4), pages 662-683, Winter.
    13. Rapoport, Amnon & Erev, Ido & Abraham, Elizabeth V. & Olson, David E., 1997. "Randomization and Adaptive Learning in a Simplified Poker Game," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 31-49, January.
    14. Rapoport, Amnon & Eshed-Levy, Dalit, 1989. "Provision of step-level public goods: Effects of greed and fear of being gypped," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 325-344, December.
    15. Thomas Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, 1983. "A strategic calculus of voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 7-53, January.
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