On the Existence of Undominated Nash Equilibria in Normal Form Games
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Cited by:
- Mauleon, Ana & Vannetelbosch, Vincent, 2004.
"Bargaining with endogenous deadlines,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 321-335, July.
- Ana MAULEON & Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH, 2001. "Bargaining with Endogenous Deadlines," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2001021, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- MAULEON, Ana & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., 2004. "Bargaining with endogenous deadlines," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1719, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Fu, Haifeng & Yu, Haomiao, 2015. "Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 7-15.
- Fu, Haifeng & Yu, Haomiao, 2018. "Pareto refinements of pure-strategy equilibria in games with public and private information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 18-26.
- Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol, 2011. "Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 531-540.
- Kultti, Klaus & Salonen, Hannu, 1997. "Undominated Equilibria in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 98-115, January.
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean, 2015.
"On equilibrium refinements in supermodular games,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 869-890, November.
- Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau & Richard McLean, 2012. "On Equilibrium Refinement in Supermodular Games," Departmental Working Papers 201207, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Ott, Marion & Beck, Marissa, 2013. "Incentives for Overbidding in Minimum-Revenue Core-Selecting Auctions," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79946, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
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