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Incentivizing cooperative agreements for sustainable forest management

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  • McEvoy, David
  • Jones, Michael
  • McKee, Michael
  • Talberth, John

Abstract

Non-industrial private forestland owners (NIPFs) manage the majority of US forestland. But land use conversion is the highest among this group, in part due to the relative paucity of income earned, these agreements can provide opportunities for long term payments from sales of timber and ecosystem services at levels sufficient to reduce the temptation to convert. In this structured well, these agreements can provide opportunities for long term payments from sales of timber and ecosystem services at levels sufficient to reduce the temptation to convert. In this paper we investigate various means of encouraging meaningful participation in cooperative agreements for forests that emphasize conservation. We report on the results obtained through a series of laboratory market experiments in which the participants play the role of NIPFs and make resource allocation decisions facing real financial incentives. Our results shed light on the relative factors that affect the success of these agreements. In particular, we find that when agreements include contribution thresholds (with money back guarantees) coupled with relatively long contract lengths, the groups are able to preserve a significant fraction of forested lands through conservation agreements.

Suggested Citation

  • McEvoy, David & Jones, Michael & McKee, Michael & Talberth, John, 2014. "Incentivizing cooperative agreements for sustainable forest management," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 34-41.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:forpol:v:44:y:2014:i:c:p:34-41
    DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2014.03.006
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    1. Sauter, Philipp A. & Mußhoff, Oliver & Möhring, Bernhard & Wilhelm, Stefan, 2016. "Faustmann vs. real options theory – An experimental investigation of foresters’ harvesting decisions," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 1-20.
    2. Lukas Giessen & Pradip Kumar Sarker & Md Saifur Rahman, 2016. "International and Domestic Sustainable Forest Management Policies: Distributive Effects on Power among State Agencies in Bangladesh," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 8(4), pages 1-28, April.
    3. François Bareille & Matteo Zavalloni & Davide Viaggi, 2023. "Agglomeration bonus and endogenous group formation," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 105(1), pages 76-98, January.
    4. Misato Inaba & Tetsuya Kawamura & Kazuhito Ogawa, 2024. "The effect of commitment in the public goods game with endogenous institution formation," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(1), pages 67-83, March.
    5. Matteo Zavalloni & Meri Raggi & Davide Viaggi, 2019. "Agri-environmental Policies and Public Goods: An Assessment of Coalition Incentives and Minimum Participation Rules," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 72(4), pages 1023-1040, April.

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